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Abstract
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of data generated by ComprasNet, the
online procurement bidding platform developed and used by the Brazilian fed-
eral government. ComprasNet is a large bidding platform used since 2001 by
more than 2200 public purchasing units who list around one million lots each
year. Over 70,000 unique bidders have participated in these auctions. In 2010,
46 percent of all procurement for the federal government was conducted through
ComprasNet, totalling R$ 27 billion, or 0.7 percent of Brazil’s GDP. In short, these
auctions represent a large share of federal tenders and a substantial amount is
contracted through them each year. Chapter 1 provides an overview of Com-
prasNet. After reviewing the literature on various topics which this dissertation
contributes to, I describe the institutional background surrounding ComprasNet.
I then present the baseline data used throughout the remainder of this disserta-
tion. Chapter 2 addresses one important aspect of designing an online ascending
auction, namely how to end the auction. ComprasNet varied its ending rules
over time, providing an unique opportunity to test theories of bidder behaviour,
as well as assessing the impact of ending rules on auction outcomes. Chapter 3
analyses a two-stage auction format which ComprasNet uses. Two-stage designs
have long been proposed by the theoretical literature, but there are virtually no
empirical works apart from experimental studies. Finally, chapter 4 analyses a
bid preference programme targeted at small and micro enterprises (SMEs). The
programme consists of setting aside eligible lots for SMEs. We first use eligibility
rules as a source of exogenous variation in the treatment assignment to estim-
ate the effects of the programme on auction outcomes. We then set up an open
auction model with endogenous entry and asymmetric bidders and estimate the
model’s primitives. In particular, we estimate entry costs, which we interpret as
red tape costs.
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Preface
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of data generated by ComprasNet, the
online bidding platform developed and used by the Brazilian federal government
for procurement of various goods and services. ComprasNet is a large bidding
platform used since 2001 by more than 2200 public purchasing units who list
approximately one million lots each year. Over 70,000 unique bidders have par-
ticipated in these auctions to date. In 2010, 46% of all procurement for the federal
government was done through ComprasNet, totalling R$ 27 billion, or 0.7% of
Brazil’s GDP. In short, these auctions represent a large share of federal tenders
and a substantial amount is contracted through them every year.
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to improve our understanding about the
functioning of online bidding platforms. To the best of my knowledge, the data
analysed has not yet been explored.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of ComprasNet. After reviewing the literat-
ure on topics addressed in the subsequent chapters, I describe the institutional
background surrounding ComprasNet. I then present a descriptive analysis of
the baseline data used throughout the remainder of this thesis. The chapter closes
with some considerations for future research based on the data presented.
Chapter 2 addresses one important aspect of designing an online ascending
auction, namely how to end the auction. While traditional English auctions end
when no bidder is willing to outbid the current bid, time limits are sometimes
used to close the auction, particularly in online auctions. eBay, for example, has
a fixed and known ending time, or a hard close. In contrast, ComprasNet auctions
have a random close: auction durations are drawn from a distribution, but the real-
izations remain unknown to bidders until the auction closes. We first document
a number of empirical regularities under random close. We find, for example,
that a random close is not enough to prevent late-bidding. We then build on the
work of Ockenfels and Roth (2006) to offer a stylised model in order to rationalise
observed bidding behaviour. Finally, we close the chapter with some consider-
ations about the efficiency and revenues under a random close. We conjecture
that a random close may harm revenues and efficiency when entry is held con-
stant. On the other hand, it gives weak bidders better chances of winning the
auction, thus encouraging entry. This increase in participation should mitigate
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the post-entry negative effect on revenues.
Chapter 3 analyses offline auctions held in ComprasNet. Offline auctions
were common in the early days of ComprasNet, when the online bidding soft-
ware was not fully developed. These offline auctions have a two-stage design.
Two-stage designs such as this have long been proposed by the theoretical liter-
ature, however there are virtually no empirical works analysing data from such
designs apart from experimental studies. I first present a stylised model of bid-
ding in a two-stage auction similar to that used by ComprasNet. I then explore
bidding behaviour in offline auctions and confront the predictions of the model
with the data. The model is currently unsatisfactory, as it fails to capture some
key features of the data. I discuss possible modifications of the model in order to
rationalise observed bidding behaviour. I then compare online and offline auc-
tions in terms of their outcomes, taking advantage of a change in regulation that
required purchasing units to use online auctions. This change introduces exogen-
ous variation on the choice of the auction format, which can be used to identify
the effects of auction rules on outcomes. I find that offline auctions attract sub-
stantially fewer bidders than online auctions and that this results in higher pro-
curement costs. The analysis however cannot disentangle the effects of auction
rules from those of the way the auction is held (online vs. offline).
In chapter 4, we analyse the effects of a bid preference programme targeting
small and micro enterprises (SMEs) in ComprasNet auctions. The programme
consists of setting aside eligible lots for favoured firms by restricting the parti-
cipation by non-favoured firms. We first provide reduced-form evidence on the
effects of the programme, taking advantage of the criteria used to restrict particip-
ation. These criteria are based on lots’ reserve prices and provide discontinuities
in the probability of treatment, allowing us to make use of them as a source of
exogenous variation to identify the effects of the programme. We find that re-
stricting participation of large firms has little effect on prices, while it increases
participation of small firms. This finding is consistent with a model of bidder
asymmetry and costly participation. In such a model, restricting participation by
large, strong bidders increases the incentives of small, weak bidders to participate
thus mitigating the adverse effects of the restriction on prices. We then set up a
structural model to estimate entry costs and simulate the effects of using different
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Chapter 1
An Overview of ComprasNet
Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of ComprasNet. After review-
ing the literature on topics addressed in the subsequent chapters,
I describe the institutional background surrounding ComprasNet. I
then present a descriptive analysis of the baseline data used through-
out the remainder of this thesis. The chapter closes with some con-
siderations for future research based on the data presented.
1.1 Introduction
Online auction markets have attracted substantial attention from economists. Be-
sides being interesting in their own right, online bidding platforms generate use-
ful data for researchers to test economic theory and understand consumer and
firm behaviour. Both the amount and type of data generated in these market-
places are different from what economists have been used to. For example, more
than 600 million items are listed every year in eBay (Bajari and Hortac¸su, 2004), a
number several orders of magnitude greater than conventional datasets. Also,
due to reduced costs in changing auction parameters, experimental variation
abound in data generated by these marketplaces (Varian (2010)). In fact, some
of early field experiments in the economics literature were conducted in online
bidding platforms (Levitt and List (2009)).
Online bidding platforms for procurement have gained popularity among
practitioners in the private and public sector alike. For example, General Elec-
tric claims to have saved USD 600 million in 2001 alone by using reverse auctions
instead of other procurement methods. FreeMarkets.com provides a platform
for companies like Quaker Oats and GlaxoSmithKline to procure billions of dol-
lars every year (Ellison and Ellison (2005)). Yet, business-to-consumer bidding
platforms–eBay in particular–have been the focus of most empirical research on
online auctions. The importance of eBay notwithstanding, it is perhaps surpris-
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ing then that researchers have not used data generated by online procurement
platforms.
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of data generated by ComprasNet,
the online procurement bidding platform developed and used by the Brazilian
federal government. ComprasNet is a large bidding platform used by more than
2200 public purchasing units since 2001 who list around 1 million lots every year.
Over 70,000 unique bidders have participated in these auctions. In 2010, 46 per-
cent of all procurement for the federal government was conducted through Com-
prasNet, totalling R$ 27 billion, or 0.7 percent of Brazil’s GDP. In short, these
auctions represent a large share of federal tenders and a substantial amount is
contracted through them every year. While this thesis focuses on the federal
ComprasNet platform, many states, municipalities and government-owned com-
panies run their own platforms, which are on the whole identical to ComprasNet.
Thus, the actual importance of ComprasNet-style auctions is likely to be even
greater than what the figures above suggest.
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to improve our understanding about the
functioning of online bidding platforms. To the best of my knowledge, the data
I analyse has not been explored before. In fact, I am unaware of any studies
that analyse data generated by government-to-business online procurement plat-
forms such as ComprasNet.
It is useful to take eBay as a benchmark to describe ComprasNet. Like eBay,
ComprasNet generates data for a wide range of products in which many unique
sellers and an even greater number of unique buyers participate. Auctioneers can
also vary many auction parameters, although they typically have less discretion
than eBay sellers. There are important differences, though: on both sides of the
platform, stakes are higher. Rather than consumers, bidders are firms, many of
which see ComprasNet as an important source of business. Moreover, the data
generated is essentially administrative. Bidders are identified by their tax rev-
enue numbers, allowing researchers to not only track bidders across auctions,
but also to obtain bidders’ characteristics such as location, firm size and reven-
ues, sector of activity, etc. Sellers are public bodies, which display variation in
observable characteristics such as location, governance, the incentive structure
within the organisation and personnel qualification.
One key motivation for this dissertation stems from the fact that the bulk of
the empirical literature on auctions has focused on a restricted set of industries
and cases. In particular, works using data from OCS auctions, timber auctions,
highway construction and, more recently, eBay have formed the core of this liter-
ature. To be sure, there are many works studying settings as varied as used cars,
treasury bonds, fish, art, wine and school milk. However justified, such narrow
focus has the drawback of limiting researchers’ ability to assess their finding’s
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external validity. This dissertation sees ComprasNet as a candidate to expand the
set of empirical application in the auctions literature.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the
literature on topics addressed in the next chapters. Section 1.3 gives a brief back-
ground of ComprasNet. Section 1.4 describes the baseline sample used through-
out the remainder of the thesis. As I present the data, I discuss selected features of
ComprasNet. Section 1.5 concludes by briefly discussing possibilities for future
research.
1.2 Literature Review
In this section, I review the literature to which this dissertation contributes. Be-
fore focusing on the specific topics addressed in each chapter, it is worth con-
sidering the big picture. Most of the literature analysing online auctions data fo-
cuses on business-to-consumer platforms, specially eBay–by far the most popular
platform amongst researches (see, for example, the review in Hasker and Sickles
(2010) for a long list of studies using eBay data). Studies analysing data generated
by procurement platforms (business-to-business or government-to-business) are
less abundant. One exception is the growing literature on internet advertise-
ment (Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007), Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2009)). These
are “sponsored search” auctions, where bidders (advertisers) bid for keywords
in search mechanisms, most notable Google and Yahoo!.
When analysing auction data, especially from internet marketplaces, research-
ers typically take the approach of focusing on a narrowly defined product. For ex-
ample, Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003) study collectible coins, Ely and Hossain (2009)
study selected DVD titles, and Lucking-Reiley (1999) studies trading cards. When
items are not identical, one typically tries to collect as many observable charac-
teristics as possible, hoping that, once those are controlled for, the products can
be considered homogeneous.
Einav et al. (2011) propose a different approach to analysing data from eBay,
which takes advantage of the vast heterogeneity of products and as such can
be valuable for other large platforms. The authors define a seller experiment in
eBay as a group of auctions for the same item by the same seller. The idea is
that, if a seller places multiple listings for identical items while varying auction
parameters–say, the reserve price or the buy-it-now option–, then the authors
take this variation in auction parameters as being as good as random. Applying
their definition of a seller experiment, they identify over 240,000 experiments,
with considerable variation in the many auction parameters. They can then es-
timate average treatment effects for each of the parameters, and let those treat-
ment effects to vary by some observables (e.g., product categories). Though one
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may object treating variation within a seller experiment as being as good as ran-
dom, their approach does improve the trade-off between a credible identification
strategy and external validity. Moreover, it illustrates how researches can use
new approaches to analyse data from internet marketplaces.
1.2.1 Chapter 2: Ending Rules, Duration, and (Last-Minute) Bid-
ding
Chapter 2 analyses ending rules used in online ComprasNet auctions. This sec-
tion reviews the evidence on the relationship between auction ending rules and
duration on one hand, and bidding behaviour and auction outcomes on the other.
There is robust evidence that bidders use two “strategies” in eBay: late bid-
ding (or sniping) and incremental bidding. For example, Bajari and Hortac¸su
(2003) note that 25% of winning bids in their sample of collectible coins arrive
after 99.8% of the auction has elapsed. Ockenfels and Roth (2006) note that 38%
of bidders in their sample submit more than one bid per auction. Although
researches have used different measures to gauge the extent of sniping and in-
cremental bidding, a number of studies have found similar patterns with larger
samples of eBay auctions for multiple product categories (see Bajari and Hortac¸su
(2004), Ockenfels et al. (2006) and Hasker and Sickles (2010) for a comprehensive
review of these studies). At first sight, it is hard to rationalise both patterns.
eBay’s proxy-bidding mechanism makes it resemble a sealed-bid second-price
auction. Under the standard independent private values (IPV) framework, the
dominant strategy is to submit one’s valuation (willingness to pay). The timing
of bids should not play a role in bidders’ strategies.
Besides detecting the practice of late bidding, Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and
Ockenfels and Roth (2006) observe that Amazon.com auctions have less late bid-
ing than eBay. Amazon uses a “soft close” ending rule, whereby the auction is
automatically extended if there are any bids within 10 minutes of the scheduled
end time. The authors interpret this as evidence that eBay’s fixed ending time, or
hard close ending rule, is a key ingredient for late-biding. One concern with these
studies is the possibility of confounding factors, such as bidders’ self-selection
into the platforms. To address these concerns, Ariely et al. (2005) perform lab
experiments in which only ending rules are varied. They find that a hard close
rule leads to more late bidding than a soft close in their controlled environment,
confirming previous findings. To explain the practice of sniping, and its link to
ending rules, many hypotheses have been put forward and tested by the literat-
ure. I arrange them into three groups.
First, and perhaps most notably, Ockenfels and Roth (2006) argue that snip-
ing may be a rational (best) response to bidders using an incremental bidding
strategy, whereby they place multiple bids. This theory implies that, from the bid-
11
der’s standpoint, sniping must dominate incremental bidding. Gray and Reiley
(2007) and Ely and Hossain (2009) conduct field experiments in eBay to measure
benefits to the bidder. Gray and Reiley (2007) select 70 pairs of identical list-
ings of various product categories. For one listing of each pair, they submit an
early bid while in the other, they snipe by submitting the same bid ten seconds
before the auction closed. Sniping led to 2.54% lower winning bids than early
bidding, but that effect is not statistically significant. Ely and Hossain (2009)
bid for identical DVDs while randomising between a sniping strategy and an
early-biding strategy. To measure bidder surplus gains, they fix their hypothet-
ical valuation at different levels, and bid their valuations using the proxy system.
They find that sniping increases the probability of winning the item by 12.7%, but
has virtually no effect on the price they pay conditional on winning. Moreover,
the effect on the winning probability decreases as their hypothetical valuation in-
creases, since a bidder with high valuation is likely to win the item regardless of
the timing of her bid.
If sniping dominates incremental bidding, then one should wonder why some
bidders use the dominated strategy. Three answers emerge: inexperienced, irra-
tional and shill bidders. Using proxies for bidders’ experience, Ockenfels and
Roth (2006) show that inexperienced bidders tend to use incremental bidding.
This explanation gained much support from the literature. Srinivasan and Wang
(2010) use entire bidding histories, and support this hypothesis. Further, they
show that novice bidders learn relatively fast that sniping dominates multiple
bidding. Ely and Hossain (2009) provide indirect evidence that experienced bid-
ders are more more likely to use a sniping strategy. They find that transaction
prices are significantly lower in auctions where snipping was assigned, and show
that sniping encourages entry from other potential bidders (what they term a
competition effect), but provokes those who enter into bidding less aggressively
(an escalation effect).1 Since sniping reduces sellers’ revenues, they conclude that
the escalation dominates the competition effect. Experienced bidders are more
likely to understand these effects, and therefore to place their bids late in the
auction. On the irrational front, Heyman et al. (2004) argue that there is a quasi-
endowment effect, whereby bidders’ willingness to pay increase during the auc-
tion. They find support for this hypothesis using laboratory experiments. How-
ever, more recent work using observational data with reasonable identification
assumptions by Einav et al. (2011) reject the hypothesis that bidders overbid in
eBay. Finally, part of the observed incremental bidding might actually be shill
biding. Engelberg and Williams (2009) estimates that 1.39% of the incremental
bidding observed in eBay comes sellers themselves trying to drive prices up.
Second, Roth and Ockenfels (2002) argue that due to network traffic, late bids
1They interpret the competition effect as a consequence of the substitutability that bidders with
unit demand typically face in eBay.
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in eBay have a positive probability of not going through. Therefore, if all bidders
place their bids late some bids will be suppressed with a positive probability–
hence lowering the winning bid and raising the surplus of the winner. Because
of this effect on transaction prices, Roth and Ockenfels (2002) interpret this story
as tacit collusion among bidders. Ockenfels and Roth (2006) show that bidding
late can arise as an equilibrium even in an IPV framework. The key parameter in
their model of eBay bidding is the probability with which a late bid is successfully
transmitted. This theory implies that if late bids were guaranteed to go through,
then the incentives for sniping are reduced. In their lab experiment, Ariely et al.
(2005) varied the probability that late bids are successfully transmitted. Under the
scenario in which bids are guaranteed to go through, the amount of late bidding
actually increases, leading them to conclude that there is little support for the ta-
cit collusion hypothesis. Another implication of the tacit collusion hypotheses is
that late bidding should soften competition, leading to lower prices. The find-
ings of Ely and Hossain (2009) therefore also provide support for this hypothesis.
Other works (Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003) and Wintr (2008)) reject this hypothesis
based on tests for differences in the distribution of bids in the presence or ab-
sence of late bidding. However, these studies use observational data and lack
credible identification strategies. Summing up, there is inconclusive evidence for
the hypotheses of tacit collusion.
A third group of hypotheses relates to the informational structure of the auc-
tion game departing from IPV. The common feature of these explanations is that
some bidders are better informed than others about the value of object. Better-
informed bidders choose to withhold their private information and snipe. Bajari
and Hortac¸su (2003) formalise this idea and show that in a model of eBay bidding
with common values bidding late is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In
the same vein, Rasmusen (2006) presents a model in which bidders are uncer-
tain about their private values, and would like to learn it during the auction,
and would benefit from knowing other bidders’ values before bidding. Thus,
their opponents would be unwilling to reveal this information during the auc-
tion, leading to sniping. One problem with this type of argument is that it cannot
explain late bidding on eBay at large, unless one is willing to assume that all
eBay auctions have a common component strong enough to trigger such bidding
behaviour.
A related, but less explored, issue is that of auction duration. In eBay, sellers
can choose between 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 days for a listing to be open for bidding.
eBay charges sellers a small fee for 10-day durations, indicating that longer dur-
ation may make the listing more profitable, perhaps by making it more visible to
buyers. Haruvy and Leszczyc (2010) conduct a field experiment in eBay in which
they list pairs of identical items. They randomly assign the duration for 1 day to
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one of the items in each pair, and 3 days to the other. They find that increasing
duration led to prices 11 percent higher. One issue with this finding is there may
be diminishing marginal returns from extending a listing’s duration. Einav et al.
(2011) report that the average listing in eBay last 5.6 days. The average (pop-
ulation) effect of randomly extending listings’ duration is probably smaller. In
fact, using their “seller experiment” approach, Einav et al. (2011) report that find
small effects of auction duration on transaction prices, and that those effects are
statistically significant only when interacted with the buy-it-now option.
1.2.2 Chapter 3: Two-round Auctions; Online vs Offline auctions
Chapter 3 analyses an offline auction format used by ComprasNet, and compares
it to the more popular online format. Offline auctions were common in the early
days of ComprasNet, when the online bidding software was not fully developed.
The offline format is interesting for two reasons. First, it uses a two-stage design–
a feature that has received increasing attention from the literature. Second, it is
commonly argued that online auctions impose less participation costs on bidders.
The fact that we observe similar items being auctioned off under the two formats
gives us a unique opportunity to compare the two.
There is a growing literature on two-stage auctions that combine features of
different standard formats. Two things motivate this literature. First, some au-
thors note that two-stage designs are already in use, but little is known about
them. For example, Perry et al. (2000) and Dutra and Menezes (2002) observe that
a number of privatization processes of state-owned companies in Italy and Brazil
were auctioned off using two-stage designs, and Ye (2007) documents widespread
use of two-stage auctions in the context of high-valued assets in the US electri-
city generation industry. Second, other authors argue that two-stage auctions
can improve on standard designs in certain contexts. Klemperer (1998) proposed
a two-stage design in the context of airwaves auctions, where standard auction
formats faced the trade-off between efficient network formation and maximizing
revenue.
Klemperer (1998) proposes the following two-stage auction game, which he
names the Anglo-Dutch auction. In the first stage, the auctioneer runs an as-
cending auction in which the price is risen continuously until all but a prede-
termined number of bidders have dropped out. The remaining bidders qualify
for the second round, which is a first-price sealed bid auction with reserve price
equal to the first round’s highest bid. The first round is therefore an English auc-
tion, and the second round is equivalent to a Dutch auction. The justification for
this design lies on ex-ante bidder asymmetries and participation costs. If parti-
cipation is costly, weak bidders have little incentives to participate in the auction,
specially in an open (English) format. A first-price, sealed-bid design however, is
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inefficient in the presence of asymmetries. Thus, Klemeperer argues, combining
the two formats gives enough incentives to weak bidders to participate, while
eliminating inefficiencies. Levin and Ye (2008) formally analyse this model and
corroborate Klemperer’s insights.
Reversing the order of the stages, Perry et al. (2000) consider a Dutch-Anglo
format under affiliated values. In the first stage, bidders submit binding sealed
bids. The two best bidders continue to the second stage, and rejected bids are
publicly announced. The second stage is a sealed-bid second-price auction aug-
mented by a reserve price, which equals the highest first-stage bid. Perry et al.
(2000) find a continuum of symmetric equilibria in first-stage bidding function.
Also, they show that their auction is revenue-equivalent to an English (ascending)
auction, but defend the two-stage design on the basis that it is less susceptible to
collusion, while keeping an easy implementation.
Dutra and Menezes (2002) also consider a Dutch-Anglo auction, but allow the
game to end in the first stage if the highest bid exceeds the second-highest bid
by more than a predetermined amount. The second stage takes place if and only
if there are bids close enough to the highest bid (i.e., their difference from the
highest bid does not exceed that predetermined amount). In this case, all bid-
ders who submitted bids sufficiently close to the highest bid play a second-price
sealed-bid auction with reserve price equal to the first stage’s highest bid. Dutra
and Menezes (2002) analyse the case with three risk-neutral bidders, and bidders’
valuations are discrete and have both a private and a common component. They
show that in this setting, their two-stage format generates more revenue than
standard auction formats.
Ye (2007) considers two-stage auctions in which first-stage bids are not bind-
ing. First-stage bids serve only as an opportunity for bidders to indicate their in-
terest in participating before paying the entry costs.2 The first stage is a sealed-bid
auction. The n highest bidders qualify to the second stage and learn the highest
rejected bid. In the second stage, bidders play a first-price, sealed bid auction. Ye
(2007) notes that this indicative biding model has no symmetric increasing equi-
librium in the first stage. This is a problem for efficient entry, since the mechanism
does not ensure that the bidder with the highest valuation enters. She proposes
an alternative qualifying rule, in which the n highest first-stage bidders must pay
a fee to enter the bid in the second stage. The fee equals the highest loosing first-
stage bid. Kagel et al. (2008) provides experimental evidence models proposed
by Ye (2007). They find that, despite the theoretical lack of increasing equilibria,
first-stage bids reflect first-stage valuations. As a result, the indicative bidding
model performs well in terms of efficiency.
2Ye (2007) motivates this setting by observing that in the context of merges and takeovers, the
auctioneer first collects non-binding bids; then, selected bidders go through the costly process of
due diligence and learn their valuation.
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1.2.3 Chapter 4: Set Asides
Chapter 4 analyses a preference programme targeting small and micro enter-
prises (SMEs). In the context of procurement auctions, preference programmes
are typically of one of two forms: bid subsidies or set asides. Bid subsidies give
favoured firms an advantage by scaling their bids by a factor, whereas set asides
restrict participation in certain auctions to favoured firms. Two issues are par-
ticularly relevant in the context of preference programmes: bidder asymmetry
and entry costs. Preference programmes are typically justified based on bidder
asymmetry: the stated goal of these programmes is to give disadvantaged (or
weak) bidders a better chance to win the auction. Apart from its empirical relev-
ance, entry costs are important because they create an important channel through
which the preference programme operates. In the presence of entry costs, bid-
ders have reduced incentives to participate in an auction. The preference pro-
gramme gives extra incentives for favoured bidders to participate by increasing
their post-entry prospects. In this section, I summarize the empirical findings on
these policies, and briefly review the literature on the estimating (static) models
of endogenous participation in auctions.
Endogenous participation in auctions is generally associated with entry costs–
under free entry, bidders cannot do worse than participating, and all potential
bidders should participate. Entry decisions are typically modelled as a two-stage
game. In the first stage, bidders decided whether or not to pay a fixed entry cost,
which enables them to then submit bids in the second stage. Following the works
of Levin and Smith (1994) and Samuelson (1985), researchers typically make one
of the following two assumptions regarding the timing that bidders learn their
values. In the model of Levin and Smith (1994), bidders incur the entry cost
before learning their private values, whereas in the model of Samuelson (1985),
bidders incur the entry cost after learning their private values. This difference
in the timing of the game has important implications for players’ strategies in
the entry stage: in the Levin-Smith model, there is a symmetric mixed-strategies
equilibrium (and many asymmetric pure strategies equilibria), while in Samuel-
son’s model the entry strategy is a cut-off-type strategy in which only bidders
whose valuation are above an equilibrium cut-off enter. Roberts and Sweeting
(2010) note that these are two extreme assumptions: bidders either have no in-
formation, or have full information prior to paying the entry cost. Roberts and
Sweeting (2010) propose an alternative model, in which bidders have imperfect
private signals prior to paying the entry cost. Upon paying the entry cost, they
then learn their values perfectly. It is not clear however which parameters can be
identified in their model.
Which entry model to use depends on the specificities of the application at
hand. For example, in the context of timber auctions Athey et al. (2011b) use
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the Levin-Smith model, arguing that bidders must perform a (costly) cruise in
the tract to assess its potential. Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) interpret entry
costs as bidding preparation costs in highway procurement auctions, and modify
the Levin-Smith model to allow heterogeneity in entry costs, as opposed to hav-
ing all bidders incurring the same fixed cost. Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011)
also “purify” the Levin-Smith model by assuming that entry costs are private in-
formation, which yields pure-strategy equilibria in the entry stage, whereby only
bidders with an entry cost below a certain cut-off participate in the auction.
The fundamental methodological problem with estimating models of mar-
ket entry is the existence of multiple equilibria. Works estimating such models
have adopted a variety of approaches to this problem. The early literature (Bres-
nahan and Reiss (1990, 1991)) placed restriction in the players’ payoffs and as-
sumed away mixed strategy equilibria. The set of pure strategies equilibria gives
a unique mapping to the the total number of entrants. Other works proceed by
making some kind of equilibrium selection assumption. For example, Athey et al.
(2011a) assume all potential strong bidders use a pure strategy entering with cer-
tainty, whereas weak bidders use a (non-degenerated) mixed strategy.
Turning to empirical results on bid preference programmes, the only two stud-
ies we are aware of that use data from set asides are those of Brannman and Froeb
(2000) and Athey et al. (2011a). Both studies use data from the US Forest Service
timber auctions. According to the programme, in a fraction of the auctions only
small mills or loggers are allowed to participate. Brannman and Froeb (2000)
use data from 51 open auctions and maintain the “button auction” assumption
and the IPV framework, parametrizing the distribution of private information.
Without accounting for endogenous participation, Brannman and Froeb (2000)
find that eliminating the set aside programme would increase government rev-
enues by 15 percent. Athey et al. (2011a) use data from 381 first-price sealed bid
auctions which were not set aside to estimate a model of endogenous participa-
tion and ex-ante asymmetric bidders. Athey et al. (2011a) find that the set aside
programme induces losses both in terms of revenue (5%) and efficiency (17%).
They also find that entry choice of small firms mitigate the effects of the set aside
programme: small firms did not increase their participation, revenue and effi-
ciency losses would be much larger, at 30 and 28 percent, respectively.
Other studies analyse bid subsidy programmes. Marion (2007) and Krasnok-
utskaya and Seim (2011), use data from the highway construction procurement
from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Caltrans gives a 5%
bid preference for small businesses. Marion (2007) takes advantage from the fact
that there is no preferential treatment in auctions for projects using federal funds.
On source of concern with this identification strategy is that state- and federal-
funded project may differ along unobservable characteristics. In a reduced-form
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analysis, he finds that preferential treatment leads to an increase in winning bids
of 3.8 percent. He also shows that, despite the fact that large firms bid more
aggressively on preference auctions conditional on participation, they also par-
ticipate less often in those auctions. Thus, entry choices from unfavoured firms
exacerbate the costs of the programme. Using a structural model, he is able to
assess efficiency losses from the programme, and finds that the marginal dol-
lar allocated to favoured firm leads to a 20-cent loss in efficiency. Again, most
of this loss comes from reduced participation from large firms. Krasnokutskaya
and Seim (2011) estimate their model using data only from auctions using bid
preferences, and allow for heterogeneous effects of the bid subsidy policy across
different projects. In particular, they show that the programme is more effect-
ive on large projects–i.e., projects where small firms are less likely to participate.
Overall, they find that the subsidy programme increases costs of procurement by
1.5 percent.
To sum up, the existing literature on bid preference programmes is increasing,
but there are few studies analysing data from set asides in particular. Moreover,
these studies analyse data from the same industry–auctions for timber harvest in
the U.S. They also face empirical challenges which can be improved on.
1.3 Institutional Background
Public procurement in Brazil uses different methods depending on the value and
nature of the goods being purchased. Reverse auction (the prega˜o) is a method
used for procurement of off-the-shelf goods, regardless of their value. Broadly,
an off-the-shelf good has three features. First, it can only be auxiliary to the end-
activity of the public body procuring them. Second, the auctioneer must be able
to fix the item specifications in a precise and concise way, so that bids can be
compared solely based on the price dimension. Finally, engineering projects are
not considered an off-the-shelf good. Although the legislation does not provide
a clear-cut definition of an “engineering project”, it is known, for example, to
include entire road resurfacing works. On the other hand, reverse auction are
sometimes used to procure small demolition works.3
These auctions are known as ComprasNet auctions, after the one-stop internet
portal that hosts the bidding platform and listings. Listings are posted by pur-
chasing units (PUs) of federal public bodies (PBs). During our sample period, the
Brazilian federal administration had 278 PBs; some PBs, such as the Army, have
hundreds of PUs, while others have only one PU.4 PUs have varying degrees of
3Federal Law 8666/93 regulates public procurement. Federal Law 10520/2002 and Federal De-
cree 5450 are specific to procurement auctions. For a detailed description of public procurement
in Brazil, see World Bank (2004).
4A public body as defined here is a Unidade Orc¸amenta´ria (UO), and a purchasing unit is a
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discretion inside the PB. The majority of listings are posted by PUs belonging to
either an education institution (45%) or the military (39%).
ComprasNet also centralizes a list of qualified suppliers. To participate in
ComprasNet auction, bidders must be pre-qualified. Pre-qualification require-
ments for these auctions are kept to a minimum, although they have changed
over time and may change from auction to auction. Being up-to-date with tax
obligations is the most important condition for a firm to be allowed to sign up for
participation in an auction.
Figure 1.1 shows the monthly number of listings appearing in ComprasNet.
ComprasNet auctions started in 2001, when PUs could choose whether to use
ComprasNet auctions or other procurement methods. As of July 2005, it is man-
datory for PUs to use ComprasNet auctions to procure off-the-shelf goods. Since
2007, ComprasNet auctions has accounted for 49% of all procurement done at the
federal level.
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1.3.1 A Typical ComprasNet Auction: Sequence of Events
Pre-bidding A typical ComprasNet auction starts with a PU defining lots it
needs to procure. A lot consists of some indivisible quantity of an off-the-shelf
Unidade Adminstrativa de Servic¸os Gerais (UASG).
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good or service.5 Several lots can be procured at the same letting session; such
group of lots is called a batch. Next, the PU must provide a reservation price for
each lot. The reservation price is calculated as the average of at least three quotes
obtained through market research conducted by the PU, and is meant to capture
the retail price of the lot. Finally, the PU advertises the tender at least 8 working
days before the letting session and publishes a tender document. The tender doc-
ument contains a detailed description of each lot, the date of the letting session,
reservation prices and the contract’s terms and conditions. It is free to download
anonymously from ComprasNet.
Bidding For each lot, interested bidders must submit qualifying (opening) bids
before a deadline specified in the tender document.6 There is no minimum bid,
nor a minimum bid increment.7 When the auction starts, the low bid is an-
nounced and bidders engage in a descending auction, where bidders can place
new bids.8 A bidder’s new bids must be strictly lower than her own previous
bids.9 Throughout the auction, bidders only learn the currently low bid, but
neither the identity of the bidders nor the history of bids. Bidding closes at ran-
dom up to 30 minutes after the auctioneer gives a warning. Chapter 2 discusses
and analyses the ending rules used in ComprasNet.
Post-Bidding After bidding closes, the auctioneer checks if the best bid is be-
low the reservation price. If it is, the best bidder is requested to submit support-
ing documentation. Required documents vary across lots, but are detailed in the
tender announcement.10 If the documentation is accepted, the lot is adjudicated.
Otherwise, the bid is disqualified and the auctioneer may request the document-
ation of the second-best bidder, and proceed that way until a valid bid is found.
The auctioneer may, at any point, cancel the auction. If the best bid is above the
reserve price, the auctioneer tries to negotiate a better price. If the bidder is un-
willing to meet the reservation price, the auctioneer has three options. First, she
can declare the bid invalid and proceed to negotiate with the second-best bidder,
and so on. Second, she may cancel the auction. Finally, she may adjudicate the
lot at a price higher than the reservation price. This is rarely done, and when it
5In principle, auctioneers may allow bidders to bid for fractions of the lot. In practice, this is
very rarely done. In the data, we noted 724 lots (out of more than 6 million) in which two or more
bidders were awarded fractions of the lot.
6Such requirement is common in some open auctions–e.g., in the U.S. Forest Service auctions,
see Haile (2001).
7To be precise, the minimum bid increment is R$0,01.
8Note that, unlike eBay, no proxy bidding is available.
9Bidders can, however, submit bids higher than other bidders’ previous bids. This is to avoid
a situation in which that typos (deliberate or otherwise) prevent bidders from placing new bids.
10Documents typically concern firms’ tax duties, but may include, for example, a cost break-
down when the lot is a service, or sample items if the lot is a good.
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is, the tender has a higher chance of being externally audited and the auction-
eer must justify her decision–e.g., reservation prices were calculated with dated
market research.
1.4 Data Description
This section describes the baseline sample used throughout the remainder of the
thesis. The sample described in this section contains 6,510,541 million lots auc-
tioned off by federal public bodies between 2004 and 2010 in ComprasNet. I use
two sources of administrative data. First, I use publicly available data automatic-
ally recorded by the ComprasNet platform.
For each lot, ComprasNet collects the following information: which firms bid
and all bids placed by each firm; the timing of the bids; the opening and clos-
ing dates and times of lots; the purchasing unit running the auction. Second,
I complement these with internal data from the Ministry of Planning, Budget
and Management. These data contain information on lots, bidders, and purchas-
ing units. On lots, there is a paragraph-long description of the item along with
classification codes following the United States’ Federal Supply Codes (FSC) for
materials and U.N. Central Product Classification for services. These classifica-
tion schemes define product categories by 2-digit codes, and sub-categories by
4-digit codes11. There are also finer 6-digit codes which are created by purchas-
ing units on a rolling basis. On bidders, the data contain the following informa-
tion: whether they are registered as a small or micro enterprise (SME); their geo-
graphical location and their industry, as defined by the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC). Finally, the internal data contains the geograph-
ical location of purchasing units, as well as their place within the government’s
organisational structure.
Table 1.1 reports statistics for the 20 most frequent product categories in the
sample. As the categories header suggests, various types of goods and services
from different industries are procured through ComprasNet auctions. Categor-
ies range from books, to pharmaceuticals, to building materials. Moreover, items
auctioned are primarily goods; only one service category (Maintenance & Install-
ation Services) makes it into the top 20. Overall, services make up 5 percent of
the number of lots (not shown in the table). Columns 1 and 2 give the total and
relative frequencies of each category. The top 6 categories account for more than
50 percent of the total number of lots.
Columns 3 and 4 give the number of unique 4-digit and 6-digit codes within
each product category. Some product categories are divided in up to 26 sub-
categories (Electrical and Eletronic Equipment Components), while other are di-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































vided in only 3 subcategories (e.g., Cleaning Equipment and Supplies). Codes
at the 6-digit level, which are created on-the-go by purchasing units, display
even larger disparities. For example, Medical and Veterinary Equipment and
Supplies, a category that includes pharmaceuticals, is divided up in more than
42,000 products at the 6-digit level. Books, Maps and Other Publications, on the
other hand, are described by 185 unique products.
Cancellation Column 5 of table 1.1 shows the percentage of lots not awarded
to any bidder–that is, lots that were cancelled. Cancellations may happen either
before or after bidding, for several reasons. First, there might be problems in the
tender document or in the online listing. For instance, the description of the lot
might contain mistakes, or the online listing is not in conformance with the tender
document. Second, cancellations are likely to happen if the best bid is higher than
the reservation price, and the best bidder is unwilling to negotiate. Finally, bids
might be rejected for non-price reasons. For instance, a bidder might have sub-
mitted a bid for an item which does not meet the required specifications, or might
fail to submitted required documentation. Overall, 8% of lots were cancelled, and
there is considerable variation across categories.
Offline auctions Column 6 shows the fraction of lots that are auctioned off us-
ing offline auctions. The offline format was more common prior to 2005, when
the online platform was not fully developed and PUs could choose between the
online and offline format. In June 2005, the same legislation that mandates the
usage of ComprasNet auctions for off-the-shelf goods, also required PUs to use
the online format. The differences between the formats go beyond what their
names suggest, and Chapter 3 discusses and analyses these differences in depth.
In total, 4% of our sample is of offline ComprasNet auctions.
Set Asides Column 7 reports the fraction of lots that are auctioned off exclus-
ively to small and micro enterprises (SMEs).12 These lots are part of a preferential
programme in federal procurement introduced in 2007. Lots whose reserve prices
are below R$80,000 are eligible to be included in the programme, at discretion of
the purchasing unit. Table 1.1 shows that 11% of all lots are included in pro-
gramme, and that this fraction varies across products categories. The set-aside
programme is the subject of Chapter 4.
Price registration Column 8 reports the fraction of lots that held under the price
registration system (PRS). The PRS was created to solve two problems. First, there
are cases in which PUs cannot know ex-ante either quantities to be demanded, or
12To qualify as a micro (small) enterprise, a firm must not have gross revenues larger than R$
360,000 (3,600,000). Prior to 2009, this threshold was R$ 240,000 (2,400,000).
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delivery dates, or both. In this case, the quantity announced in the tender is an
upper bound of how much of that item the PU will demand in the next, say, 12
months. Second, the PRS helps to circumvent the requirement that public bodies
have available funds for any purchases at the time of the tender announcement.
Due to uncertainty in the public bodies’ budgets, auctioneers may find it benefi-
cial to hold listings under the PRS which does not require funds to be available.
To sum up, the PRS gives auctioneers the flexibility of acquiring quantities up to
the amount originally announced in the tender, without creating the obligation to
acquire any of that quantity. Around 49% of the listings are held under the PRS.
This is an interesting parameter for it may introduce uncertainty to bidders, who
do not know how much, if any, of the quantity announced will be purchased.
Moreover, some bidders may be better informed than others if they have experi-
ence in supplying a particular public body.
To highlight some key features of these auctions, Table 1.2 presents summary
statistics of selected variables.
Reservation Prices and Winning Bids The third row of table 1.2 reveals that,
conditional on being accepted, winning bids are on average 69 percent of the
lot’s reservation prices. There is also sizeable variation on winning bids: in one
quarter of lots, the winning bid is below 51 percent, and in another quarter, they
are above 93 percent of the reserve price. As noted in section 1.3, reservation
prices are calculated based on market surveys and are meant to capture the re-
tail price of the lot. In fact, the reservation price is commonly called “estimated”
or “reference” price in the ComprasNet jargon. Such feature has a few interest-
ing implications. First, reservation prices should capture many unobservable (to
the researcher) characteristics of the lot. Second, identical lots display a lot more
variation in reservation prices when compared to other settings.13 Second, reser-
vations prices of large lots are likely to ignore possible quantity discounts. This
helps to explain the magnitude of discrepancy between reservation prices and
winning bids.
Tender Notice, Auction Duration and Bids Placed Table 1.2 reveals that tenders
are announced on average 14.4 days prior to the letting day. During this period,
bidders may ask for clarifications about the lot’s specifications. Bidding itself
takes place over the course of 65 minutes on average. In this respect, ComprasNet
is very different from eBay, where listings are open for bidding for periods from
3 up to 10 days. ComprasNet does not offer a proxy bidding system, which helps
explaining the number of bids per bidder placed in an auction.
13For example, in the US Forest Service, auctioneers set reservation prices at one of three pre-
established levels.
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Table 1.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics: All Listings 2004–2010
Mean Std. Dev. 25th pctile 75th pctile
Log Reserve Pricea,c 6.55 2.30 4.91 8.01
Log Winbida,b 6.23 2.31 4.60 7.69
Winbid/Reserve 0.69 0.25 0.51 0.93
Ranked2− Ranked1
Ranked1
0.10 0.25 0.00 0.08
# of Bidders 5.84 5.11 2.00 8.00
# of Small Bidders 4.85 4.67 2.00 7.00
# of Bidders in Same State 2.71 2.86 1.00 4.00
Tender Notice (days)d 14.46 7.53 12.00 14.00
Auction Duration (minutes)e 65.64 55.66 34.53 75.28
# of bids per bidder 4.16 6.55 1.25 4.22
Listing Canceled 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00
Geographic Region
North 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00
Northeast 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.00
Southeast 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
South 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00
Central-West 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00
# of Lots 6,510,541
Notes: Table shows summary statistics for all listings posted by federal purchasing units between June 2004 and
December 2010. (a) Monetary values are measured in nominal R$. (b) No winning bid is observed in 875,287 obser-
vations due to cancelation or no bids being submitted. (c) No reserve price is observed in 71,475 the observations.
(d) Tender notice is the number of days between tender announcement in ComprasNet and bidding day. (e) Only for
Online auctions; no duration is observed in 814,880 observations due to no bids being submitted, or the way data is
sometimes recorded.
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Bundles Participation in one lot is not tied to participation in other lots, except
in cases where lots are bundled. Bundled lots are awarded to the bidder making
the best combined bid in all lots of the bundle. Bundles were introduced for two
reasons. First, some items may require some kind of uniformity among them (dif-
ferent pieces of furniture to refurbish an office space, for example). Second, there
are gains of scale in contract monitoring for similar, or complementary items. For
example, air conditioners may be bundled with their respective installation ser-
vices. In total, 662,760 items are bundled. In the next chapters, bundled lots are
excluded from the data.
Batches As noted in section 1.3, lots are typically auctioned off in batches. Al-
though batches are common in many settings– think, for instance, of an evening
of art auctions at Sothebys’–I emphasize this feature here for two reasons. First,
lots belonging to the same batch share certain characteristics. In other words, cer-
tain variables in my dataset have variation only across batches. For example, the
tender notice is the same for all lots of a batch. Second, lots of a batch are typ-
ically similar, and bidders usually participate in multiple lots in a batch. There
may complementarities in lots of the same batch–for example, economies of scale
in transportation costs or fixed costs of participation at the batch level. To give
a sense of how much is auctioned off in a batch, Table 1.3 gives statistics of the
batches’ total reserve prices.
Table 1.3: Total Batch Reserve Prices
Total Batch Reserve Prices (R$)
# of Lots # of Batches Mean 10th pctile Median 90th pctile
1 65,572 396,080 7,700 48,585 512,000
2-9 60,621 524,982 8,019 44,313 524,500
10-49 47,063 726,763 10,525 65,537 765,046
50-100 15,110 1,198,542 15,077 103,106 1,542,010
100+ 16,520 2,846,299 29,957 257,170 4,083,161
Total 204,886 774,113 9,346 60,000 810,948
Notes: the first column shows the number of batches in the sample with lots given by the row headers. The
remaining columns give statistics of the total reserve price of batches with lots given by the row headers.
Reserve price are measured in nominal R$.
Bidders Over 70,500 unique firms have participated in these auctions. Table
1.2 sheds some light on the nature of these firms. In a typical auction, 5 out of
6 firms are registered as a small or micro enterprise with the tax authorities.14
14The set aside programme can partially explain this figure, as 11% of all auctions were restric-
ted to small or micro enterprises.
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One feature of these data is the remarkable variation in the number of bidders
across auctions. I explore the determinants of entry in an auction with a Poisson
regression of the number of bidders on various covariates.
The results are presented in Table 1.4. I find that the number of bidders has
increased over the years, but displays seasonal variation within a year. For ex-
ample, the coefficients on the yearly dummies imply that the typical auction in
2009 had 27.7 percent more bidders than a typical auction in 2004. But auctions
in the last quarter have on average 34.6 percent fewer bidders than auctions in the
first quarter. I offer the following explanation for these patterns. Looking back
at Figure 1.1, we can see that the number of auctions has increased over time,
and displays wide seasonal variation. The fact that the number of bidder has in-
creased in the long run is probably related to the increase in the supply-side of
ComprasNet: by relying more on ComprasNet, the government attracted more
bidders to the platform. However, the large spike in the number of auctions at
the end of each years creates a congestion effect in the short run, whereby PUs
compete for a relatively inelastic pool of bidders.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter provides an overview of ComprasNet. ComprasNet is a large online
marketplace which accounts for a sizeable share of public procurement in Brazil.
The next chapters analyse some interesting features of ComprasNet. There are a
number of other interesting topics to be addressed in future research with these
data, two of which I outline here.
First, these auctions–and federal procurement in general–display tremendous
seasonality; 25% of the procurement activity is conducted in the four weeks pre-
ceding the end of the fiscal year. After talking to procurement officials, the fol-
lowing story emerged. Public bodies have lapsing budgets, that is, any left-overs
from one fiscal year are lost and cannot be spent on the subsequent year. In ad-
dition, there is uncertainty both on the supply of funds and on the demand side.
As a result, procurement managers prioritize spending throughout the year, and
rush to spend any unused resources before the budget expires. Liebman and Ma-
honey (2010) document the same phenomenon in US public procurement. In fact,
many organisations, both private and public, operate their budget under similar
rules.
Such seasonality in procurement activity is negatively correlated with the av-
erage number of bidders, as we saw in table 1.4. This suggests that bidders have
participation constraints. There are alternative explanations, such as seasonality
in other business in which bidders also participate. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile
exploring further price patterns, to gauge the extent to which budget rules have
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Table 1.4: Determinants of Entry: Number of Bidders
OLS Poisson
Variable Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Log Reserve Price 0.552 (0.001) 0.092 (0.000)
PRS 0.908 (0.004) 0.149 (0.001)
Offline -2.661 (0.008) -0.566 (0.002)
Log # Items in Batch -0.245 (0.002) -0.041 (0.000)
Tender Notice 0.009 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Quarter of Year (1st omitted)
2 Quarter -0.714 (0.009) -0.105 (0.001)
3 Quarter -0.913 (0.008) -0.135 (0.001)
4 Quarter -2.101 (0.008) -0.347 (0.001)
Year (2004 omitted)
2005 0.377 (0.016) 0.070 (0.004)
2006 0.619 (0.016) 0.124 (0.003)
2007 0.995 (0.016) 0.200 (0.003)
2008 1.105 (0.016) 0.219 (0.003)
2009 1.464 (0.016) 0.276 (0.003)
2010 1.396 (0.016) 0.264 (0.003)
Geographic Region (North omitted)
Northeast 0.627 (0.006) 0.109 (0.001)
Southeast 0.475 (0.006) 0.080 (0.001)
South 0.024 (0.006) 0.005 (0.001)
Central 0.766 (0.006) 0.121 (0.001)
4-digit code dummy Yes Yes
N 6,439,066 6,439,066
R2 0.297 0.171
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of bidders in the auction. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 71,475 obser-
vations are dropped from the sample due to missing reservation prices.
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knock-on effects on auction outcomes. Transaction-level data can help assess-
ing whether these rules lead to wasteful spending in the sense of Bandiera et al.
(2009).
Second, corruption and collusion are common phenomena in public procure-
ment, both in developed and developing economies. For example, Ferraz and
Finan (2011) list some observed practices of corruption in public procurement in
Brazil. It is therefore intriguing that after more than 10 years of ComprasNet oper-
ation, reports of corruption and/or collusion in these auctions have been, at best,
anecdotal. This fact can be interpreted in two opposite, but non-excludable ways.
On one hand, it could mean that these practices are, in fact, rare on ComprasNet.
A World Bank report, for example, found that the procedures in ComprasNet, al-
though not foolproof, are amongst best procurement practices. Tran (2008) finds
that replacing traditional procurement methods with online reverse auctions, re-
duced bribing in one developing country’s public tenders. On the other hand,
it may be that the detection, but not the practice, of corruption and collusion in
ComprasNet is low. The truth probably lies in between the two extremes; given
the absence of rigorous studies using these data, a thorough analysis is called for.
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Chapter 2
Ending Rules in Online Auctions
Abstract
One important aspect of designing an online ascending auction
is how to end the auction. While traditional English auctions end
when no bidder is willing to outbid the previous bid, time limits
are sometimes used to terminate an auction. eBay, for example, has
a fixed and known ending time, or a hard close. In contrast, Com-
prasNet auctions have a random close: auction durations are drawn
from a distribution, but the realisations remain unknown to bidders
until the auction closes. We first document a number of empirical
regularities under random close in ComprasNet. We find that (i)
bidders defer bidding to the end phase of the auction; (ii) a sizeable
fraction of auctions is resolved early in the auction; (iii) bid incre-
ments are typically small; (iv) large bid increments are more likely
to occur early in the auction. We then build on the work of Ockenfels
and Roth (2006) to offer a stylised model in order to rationalise ob-
served bidding behaviour. Finally, we close the chapter with some
considerations about the efficiency and revenues under a random
close. We conjecture that a random close may harm revenues and
efficiency when entry is held constant. On the other hand, it gives
weak bidders better chances to win the auction, thus encouraging
entry. This increase in participation should mitigate the post-entry
negative effect on revenues.
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2.1 Introduction
One important aspect of designing an ascending auction is how to end the auc-
tion. While traditional English auctions end when no bidder is willing to outbid
the previous bid, time limits are frequently used to terminate an auction. Two
prominent examples are eBay, which uses a fixed and known ending time, known
as a hard close, and Amazon, where auctions are automatically extended if a bid
is placed close to the current scheduled ending time–a soft close. Such differences
can have significant effects on bidding behaviour: for example, bidders on eBay
have an incentive to place last-minute bids, a strategy known as sniping (Ocken-
fels and Roth (2006)). The effects of ending rules on auction outcomes (revenues
and participation) are less well understood.
ComprasNet is, for a number of reasons, an interesting case study of the ef-
fects of ending rules on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes. First, Com-
prasNet has varied its ending rules over time, a feature rarely observed in online
platforms.1 Evidence based on cross-platforms comparisons suffer from a series
of confounding factors, such as buyer and seller self-selection, and platform repu-
tation. Analysing data from a single platform eliminates many of these concerns.
In addition, the data generated by ComprasNet allows us to track bidders over
time and observe them in different regimes. We can therefore control for bid-
der idiosyncrasies while at the same time assessing the influence of experience in
bidding patterns.
Second, ComprasNet uses different ending rules from those observed in eBay
and Amazon, providing us with evidence on new auction designs. In one design,
auctions close at random – bidders do not know and cannot influence the ending
times. We call this ending rule random close. In another design, the auction dur-
ation is extended for each submitted bid, but the maximum duration is capped.
Bidders are not aware of the fact that new bids extend the duration, although they
certainly can infer that the auction duration is skewed to the left. We show that in
practice this ending rule amounts to a quasi-hard close because, despite some ran-
dom variation in the ending time, there is considerable mass at one short interval
of the support of auction duration.
The fact that auctions with a random close are rarely observed outside of Com-
prasNet might be partially due to IBM’s US patent on this kind of auction (IBM
calls them “smooth-finish” auctions).2 As Klemperer (2004) points out, the fact
that IBM was granted this patent in 2003 is perhaps surprising, as auctions in-
corporating a random ending time have a long history. Cassady (1967) describes
variants of a candle auction, which was commonly used in Great Britain in the
1One exception is Yahoo, which used to offer sellers the option to list items under a hard close
(eBay-style auctions) and a soft close (Amazon-style).
2Available at http://patft.uspto.gov/.
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seventeenth century. In one variant, the auctioneer inserts a pin close to the top
of a candle, and bids can only be placed as long as the pin is held to the candle.
The other variation occurred in some auctions held outdoors. Bids could only be
placed so long as the flame was alive. In essence, both variants are random close
auctions, since bidders cannot tell precisely when the auction is going to end.
Both Cassady’s account and IBM’s patent suggest that auctions with a ran-
dom ending time may have attractive features for auctioneers. More generally,
Cassady’s writings also demonstrate that the use of time limits for closing as-
cending auctions long predates, and is not restricted to, online auctions.3 It is not
surprising then that eBay’s hard close ending rule and its implications for bid-
ding behaviour, has generated a large literature on the topic (see for instance the
references in Hasker and Sickles (2010)).
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, we document stylised facts
of bidding behaviour under the different ending rules used by ComprasNet. We
find that, under both ending rules (i) bidders wait until the end phase of the auc-
tion to bid; (ii) a sizeable fraction of auctions is resolved early; (iii) bid increments
are typically small; (iv) large bid increments are more likely to occur early in the
auction. Among other implications, these facts imply that a random close does
not necessarily rule out late bidding. Second, we build on the work Ockenfels
and Roth (2006) to develop a simple model that captures the key elements of bid-
ding behaviour in auctions with a random ending time. It is important to note
that ascending auctions are complex dynamic games, and generally cannot be
fully analysed with available methods. Such complexity has led researchers to
rely on abstractions for tractability, modelling ascending auctions as a “button
auctions”, as in Milgrom and Weber (1982). Time limits bring additional diffi-
culties in modelling ascending auctions by augmenting bidders’ strategy space.
As a result, any attempt to model ascending auctions with time limits is bound
to be a drastic simplification of reality, aimed at capturing only the most salient
features of the auction game.
English auctions have many desirable features (Cramton (1998)), and so it is
not clear what the arguments are for modifying its ending rules and include time
limits. To the best of our knowledge, the literature has not offered any answers
to this question from a theoretical perspective. From a practical point of view,
bidding can be time-consuming and costly for auction participants. Time limits
can therefore be seen as a way of limiting the escalation of these costs.4 In the case
3Fu¨llbrunn and Sadrieh (2012) describe various instances of items sold through random close
(candle) auctions. Cassady (1967) describes an auction for toll rights conducted in 1932 in which
a time limit was set by an hour glass. Cassady points out that no bids were placed until the sand
had nearly run out; it seems that bidders on eBay did not invent the “sniping” strategy after all.
4Cassady (1967) puts forward an alternative rationale for time limits. Bidders may need time to
assess the item’s value; an English auction without time limits forces bidders to keep on bidding.
Of course, this argument relies on the fact that bidders are not well informed of the item’s value.
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of ComprasNet, such practical considerations were probably in play, but there
were two other reasons for the choice for a random close. First, it was meant
to preclude procurement officials giving favoured bidders an unfair advantage
by passing on information about the ending time of the auction. Second, it was
meant to curb the practice of sniping, widely observed in hard close auctions
in eBays.5 Procurement officials seem to believe that sniping is detrimental to
auction revenues, a view that finds some support in the empirical literature, see
Ely and Hossain (2009).
In our model, we show that, in auctions with a random ending time, bidders
with valuations above a certain threshold may have an incentive to bid more
aggressively early in the game, but also that, as the game enters the ending phase,
all bidders use an incremental bidding strategy. We conjecture, but do not show
formally, that this behaviour will lead low-valuation bidders who are still willing
to bid in the final stage to win the auction with higher probability than under a
traditional English auction. This, in turn, has a direct negative effect on revenues
and efficiency, but also has a concomitant positive effect on entry; this additional
entry positively affects revenues, thus counteracting the negative direct effect.
This chapter contributes to the literature on ascending auctions with time lim-
its. In particular, this chapter is close in spirit to the works of Roth and Ocken-
fels (2002) and Ockenfels and Roth (2006). We are unaware of any existing work
analysing, either theoretically or empirically, the auction institutions studied in
this paper. The only exception is Fu¨llbrunn and Sadrieh (2012), who attempt to
develop a model of these auctions and perform lab experiments. The authors
attempt to model a random close auction, but they model it as a second-price
auction. As a result, they find an equilibrium in which bidders bid their true
valuation. The experimental evidence they provide however rejects the predic-
tion of their model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes in
detail the bidding timeline in ComprasNet, the ending rules used and the changes
that have occurred to those rules. In Section 2.3, we present the data and describe
some key facts of bidding under the different ending rules. Section 2.4 presents a
model of auctions with a random ending time. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Environment and Data
This section describes the timing of an online ComprasNet auction, as well as the
natural experiments that have occurred.
It also ignores other possible arrangements that give bidders enough time to revise their bids
without imposing time pressure on them. For example, in the UK 3G spectrum auction bidding
went for as many rounds as needed, and the number of rounds in any given day was limited.
5This argument is also made by Trevathan and Read (2011) and Malaga et al. (2010).
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Pre-bidding Listings appear on ComprasNet at least 8 working days before the
letting session. The tender document contains a detailed description of each lot,
the date of the letting session, reservation prices and the contract’s terms and
conditions. It is free to download anonymously from ComprasNet.
Bidding Interested bidders must submit a sealed bid before a pre-specified dead-
line, after which no bidder may enter the auction. Figure 2.1 depicts the bidding
timeline after this point. At t0 sealed bids are open, and bidders learn the low
bid. Bidders can now place as many new bids as they want. A bidder can only
place bids strictly lower than her own previous bids.6 t1 is unknown to bidders.
At t1 the auctioneer announces t2, the start of the ending phase. At t2, a number
dC is calculated according to an algorithm described below. The realisation of dC
remains unknown to bidders (and the auctioneer). At t3 = t2 + dC the auction
ends. The low bidder at t3 wins and pays her bid.










Phase A: Opening Phase B: Warning Phase C: Ending
Ending Rules An ending rule is an algorithm that determines the duration of
Phase C. Two ending rules have been in used in ComprasNet. Under a random
close ending rule, dC is drawn from the uniform distribution in the [0,30] minutes
interval. In a quasi-hard close ending rule, dC is the sum of a random draw from the
uniform [5,30] and one random draw from the uniform [0,2] for each bid placed
in the auction, but it remains capped at 30 minutes. The precise quasi-hard close
algorithm is given in the appendix. In practice, a quasi-hard close puts a lot of mass
on the interval between 28 and 29 minutes, as we will see in the next section.
6Bidders can, however, submit bids higher than other bidders’ previous bids. This is to avoid
a situation in which that typos (deliberate or otherwise) prevent bidders from placing new bids.
The platform software uses an algorithm to spot this sort of typos, but might take a few seconds
to exclude mistaken bids, or might simply fail to spot typos.
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Notes: All changes between 15/Apr/2006 and 16/Dec/2010 were unannounced both to bidders and auctioneers. The period 
between  15/Apr/2006 and 25/Sep/2006 was similar to the quasi-hard close algorithm described in the paper, but had minor 
differences. We therefore do not use data from that period.
Ending Rule
I
II  III  IV
Changes to Ending Rules There have been changes in the ending rule over
time, as illustrated by Figure 2.2. Between June 2004 and April 2006 (Period I),
the random close was used.7 In April 2006, ComprasNet changed the ending
algorithm to the quasi-hard close. After speaking to procurement officials, the
following story emerged. The ending rule algorithm was changed after repeated
complaints from (loosing) bidders that they did not have enough time to place
their bids. ComprasNet developers then changed the ending rule to the quasi-
hard close, effectively allowing for more bidding time in Phase C. It seems that
during the period between April 2006 and September 2006, different algorithms
were used, but we were not able to recover the precise rules and therefore did
not use data from this period.8 Between September 2006 and September 2010
(Period II), the quasi-hard close was unchanged. It is unclear why ComprasNet
switched back to the random close between September and 13 December 2010
(Period III), and back again to quasi-hard close after 14 December 2010 (Period
IV).9 It is important to note that bidders did not have knowledge of the exact
functioning of the quasi-hard algorithm. In particular, bidders were unaware of
the fact that the software extended the duration of Phase C with the number of
7It is unclear how to classify the the way ComprasNet ended auctions prior to June 2004. It
seems that auctioneers had control over the ending time, but would not reveal it precisely to
bidders. Furthermore, duration data was not embedded in the HTML files containing the records
of each auction, so we cannot collect this information.
8However, we noted that all the algorithms used between April 2006 and September 2006 had
in common a minimum of 5 minutes for bidding as well as automatic extensions when bids were
placed. The duration of Phase C was kept capped at 30 minutes for most of this period, although
we observed a few cases in which Phase C lasted for up to 35 minutes.
9In fact, procurement officials do not seem to be aware of those changes at all. In March 2011,
an external auditing body ruled that the ending rule was to be reversed to a random close. Our
data however end in December 2010.
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bids; they simply observe changes in the duration of Phase C.10
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Notes: The Figure shows the distribution of Phase C in Periods I (random close) and II (quasi-hard close). Bins
represent 30-second intervals.
2.2.1 Data
For the purposes of this chapter we restrict the sample to auctions held in Periods
I and II.11 We also require that auctions in our sample have at least one bidder.
We select data for eight commonly purchased products: books, A4 paper, ink
cartridges, printers, air conditioners, coffee powder, computers and bottled cook-
ing gas. Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for each period in the sample.
The table shows detailed information on the duration of each auction phase. As
expected, the average duration of Phase C in Period I is 15 minutes. More details
on the distribution of of Phase C duration are given in Figure 2.3.
Table 2.1 also reports statistics for the number of bids per bidder placed. In
a typical auction in Period I, a bidder places on average 1.95 bids. Of these, 1.36
10In fact, bidders (and auctioneers) were not officially warned of any of these changes. Any
changes in bidders’ behaviour due to change in the ending rules therefore must have come
through learning.
11Analysing periods III and IV would certainly be interesting, but adds little value given the
current purposes of this chapter.
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bids (or 70 percent) are placed in Phase C. Note however, that in a typical auction,
the duration of Phase C accounts for 19 percent of the total auction duration. This
is the first sign that bidders delay bidding to Phase C, a point we will return to
in the next section. This pattern is even stronger in Period II, where Phase C
accounts for 38 percent of the auction duration and for 85 percent of the bids.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics by Period
Period 1 Period 2
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log Win Bid 5.21 1.74 5.46 1.88
Log Reserve 5.60 1.80 5.87 1.94
Win Bid/Reserve 0.71 0.19 0.70 0.20
# Bidders 6.61 6.10 7.76 7.58
Duration of Auction Phases
(minutes)
Phase A (dA) 55.75 68.53 28.74 45.43
Phase B (dB) 8.79 10.91 6.32 8.84
Phase C (dC) 15.02 8.67 21.73 7.49
Total Auction Dur. 79.14 71.59 56.77 47.94
# of Bids Per Bidder
Phase C 1.36 3.48 2.37 5.59
All Phases 1.95 4.15 2.77 5.94
Product Subcategory









Notes: Period I has a random close and Period II a quasi-hard close.
The definitions of periods are given in Figure 2.2. Duration of Phase A
is missing in 43,323 observations in Period I and 7,095 observations in
Period II due to data recording issues. In those cases, overall Auction
Duration is also missing.
2.3 Stylised Facts
In this section we document some key features of bidding behaviour in random
close auctions.
2.3.1 Bid Increments and Jump Bidding
Since we observe all bids placed, we can gauge the extent of incremental and
jump bidding. In each auction, we calculate bid increments. Specifically, we
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, k = 1, ..., K, t = 1, ...T, (2.1)
where jk,t is the k-th bid placed in auction t and rt is the reservation price of auc-
tion t. When k = 1, we take the best sealed bid as k = 0. Since these are procure-
ment auctions, bid increments are negative.12 A large negative number indicates
bid jumping, whereas a number close to zero indicates a small increment.
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of bid increments. In Period I, the average
and the median increment are respectively 0.35 and 0.05 percent of the reserve
price. These numbers are not very different in Period II: 0.56 and 0.04 for the
average and median, respectively. However, bid increments display variation
across auction phases. In Phases A and B of Period I, the average increment was
of 0.44 and 0.43 percent, whereas in Phase C this figure was 0.31 percent (p-values
against Phase A and B both <0.001). The same pattern can be seen in Period II.
Overall, these numbers suggest that (i) there is little jump bidding in both periods,
and that (ii) increments tend to be larger in Phases A and B than in Phase C.
Table 2.2: Distribution of Bid Increments
Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctile 50th Pctile # of Obs.
Period I
Phase A -0.0044 0.0272 -0.0020 -0.0003 179,681
Phase B -0.0043 0.0173 -0.0023 -0.0005 80,869
Phase C -0.0031 0.0126 -0.0021 -0.0005 524,917
Total -0.0035 0.0175 -0.0021 -0.0005 785,467
Period II
Phase A -0.0109 0.0477 -0.0034 -0.0004 476,987
Phase B -0.0117 0.2098 -0.0040 -0.0005 254,630
Phase C -0.0047 0.0206 -0.0019 -0.0004 4,415,186
Total -0.0056 0.0525 -0.0021 -0.0004 5,146,803
Notes: Table shows statistics for increments between consecutive bids normalised by the re-
serve price. In Period I, a total of 897,394 bids were placed in 65,593 auctions. In Period II, a
total of 6,713,923 bids were placed in 336,624 auctions. Increments can sometimes be positive,
as bidders may submit bids that have already been outbid. Positive increments are not coun-
ted, leaving 785,467 observed increments in Period I and 5,146,803 in Period II.
2.3.2 Timing of Bids
In section 2.2, we documented the fact that bidders place more bids in Phase C
of the auction. To better capture this behaviour, Figure 2.4 plots the empirical
cumulative distribution functions of the number of bids per minute, for the three
auction phases. The distribution of bids per minute in Phase C dominates the
12In practice, increments can sometimes be positive, since bidders may submit bids that have
already been outbid. In what follows, positive increments are ignored.
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those of Phases B and C. This indicates that bidders delay placing their bids to
Phase C.
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We look at this phenomenon from a different angle in Figure 2.5. For auctions
in Period I, we calculate the time distance of each bidders’ last bids to the end of
the auction. We then plot the cumulative distribution of this distance for auctions
whose duration was in the (10,11], (15,16] and (20,21] minutes intervals in Figure
2.5. All three distributions display a kink at beginning of Phase C. The figure
reveals, for example, that when Phase C lasts between 15 and 16 minutes, 20
percent of bidders’ last bids arrive in the last 5 minutes. Figure 2.5 also reveals
that, despite the increased activity in Phase C, many bidders place their last bids
in Phases A or B. For example, when Phase C lasts between 20 and 21 minutes,
40 percent of last bids arrive before Phase C starts.
We look at these numbers more closely in Table 2.3. The table reveals that, in
Period I, 17 percent of auctions were resolved in Phases A or B, and 53 percent
had bids placed in Phase C. The remaining 30 percent of auctions were resolved
without a single bid being placed in the ascending stage–i.e., these auctions were
won by the bidder submitting the highest sealed bid. The numbers for Period II
are similar to those for Period I.
We now turn to the importance of the timing of bids to auction outcomes.
Specifically, we look at the relationship between auction duration and winning
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Duration of End Phase
Notes: The Figure uses data from Period I only.
bids. If bidders actively use Phase C to place their final bids, then auctions with
longer Phase C duration should have smaller winning bids. To capture this effect,
we run regressions of the form:
pt = Xtβ+ γ f (dCt) + et, (2.2)
where pt is the (normalized) winning bid of auction t; Xt is a vector of auction
controls including, geographical and time-specific covariates, and the length of
the opening and warning phases; and f (dCt) is a polynomial function of the
Table 2.3: Fraction of Auction’s Last Bids in...
Period 1 Period 2
Phases A or B 0.17 0.11
Phase C 0.53 0.68
Last 10 Seconds 0.08 0.09
Last 1 Minute 0.23 0.18
Last 5 Minutes 0.38 0.35
Last 10 Minutes 0.47 0.50
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length of the ending phase.
Table 2.4: Effects of duration on Price
Period 1 Period 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dC/10 -0.022 -0.016 0.015 -0.002
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
(dC/10)2 0.004 0.001 -0.015 -0.006









Year Dummies X X
Quarter Dummies X X
Good Dummies X X
State Dummies X X
Observation 65,593 22,270 336,624 329,529
R2 0.003 0.180 0.023 0.185
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Variations in the sample
size within a Period are due to missing data for the duration of Phase A, as
explained in section 2.2.
Table 2.4 reports the results. For each Period, we run 2 specifications. In
Period I, the winning bid is decreasing and concave on the duration of Phase C
(dC). The coefficients in column (1) imply that the winning bid drops, on average,
by 1.4 percent in the first 10 minutes, and by 0.6 percent in the next 10 minutes of
Phase C. The introduction of other auction covariates in column (2), as expected,
does not alter this result. In Period II, the winning bid is decreasing and convex
on the dC: the coefficients in column (3) imply that in the first 10 minutes the win-
ning bid is expected to drop by 1.5 percent, and by an extra 4.5 percent in the next
10 minutes. One possible explanation for this change is that, in Period II, dC is
positively correlated with the number of bidders in the auction, and the number
of bidders in the auctions is negatively correlated with the winning bid. In other
words, the coefficients on dC in columns (3) and (4) are likely to be picking up the
effect of the increased number of bidders over time in ComprasNet.
To sum up, we find that (i) bidders defer bidding to the end phase of the
auction; (ii) a sizeable fraction of auctions is resolved early; (iii) bid increments
are typically small; (iv) large increments are more likely to occur early on the
auction. In the next section, we developed a model to rationalise these observed
patterns in the data.
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2.4 A model of Auctions with Random Ending Time
In this section, we present a basic theoretic framework for ascending auctions
with a random ending time. We closely follow the formulation presented in Ock-
enfels and Roth (2006) for auctions with a hard close and adjust the game for
the random close case. We also perform some comparative statics exercises to
highlight the key differences between hard close and a random close.
In what follows, we assume that the highest bidder wins and pays the second
highest bid. This would be the case in ascending auctions with a proxy bidding
system, like eBay. In absence of a proxy mechanism, as it is the case of Com-
prasNet, this assumption is an abstraction necessary for tractability (Milgrom and
Weber (1982)). Below we present the strategic structure of an auction with ran-
dom ending time.
• There is a single seller auctioning a single indivisible object.
• There are n ≥ 2 buyers (bidders), denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• Each bidder has private valuation vi ∈ [0, v¯] drawn identically and inde-
pendently according to some distribution F(v).
• The minimum initial bid equals 0. (i.e. there is no reservation price for the
seller13.)
• A player can place a single bid bti at any time t ∈ T = {0} ∪ {t1(m) =
m
m+1 ; m = 1, 2, . . . } ∪ {1} ∪ {t2(m) = 2m+1m+1 ; m = 1, 2, . . . } ∪ {2}. If a player
i ∈ N at some time t ∈ T does not bid, then we denote her bid as bti =
∅. This formulation states that the auction game has four periods, two of
which are divided in an infinite and countable number of subperiods. This
resembles the bidding timeline of ComprasNet, see Figure 2.1.






′ > t for bt′i 6= ∅ and bti 6= ∅.
• At any given time t ∈ T, players can submit bids simultaneously without
knowing what other bids are placed.
• The bid history at some time t lists all the bids placed up to that time along
with the identities of the bidders.
• The auction ends either at the end of time t = 1 with probability h ∈ (0, 1)
or at the end of time t = 2 with the remaining probability, 1− h.
13For any seller’s reservation price r ∈ (0, v¯), the results do not change.
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• Depending on the ending time realization t¯, the highest bidder wins the
auction paying the highest submitted bid from another bidder according to
the bid history and the last bids placed at t¯ (if any).
• A bidder who wins the auction at some price p earns vi − p, a bidder who
does not win earns 0.
• A player has time to react to another player’s bid at any time t ∈ T \ {1, 2},
however the reaction can not be instantaneous. Any reaction bt
′
i to a bid b
t
j
for i 6= j can arrive earliest at t′ = t1(1) if t = 0, or at t′ = t1(m + 1) if
t = t1(m) for some m, or at t′ = t2(m′ + 1) if t = t2(m′) for some m′.
• Equal bids from different bidders are resolved by order of arrival (first bid-
der to submit has priority) or, if they were simultaneously submitted, at
random with equal probability.
• Any bid submitted at t ∈ T \ {1, 2} is transmitted with certainty.
• A bid submitted at time t = 2 is successfully transmitted with probability
0 < q < 1, where q is an exogenously given probability.
• Similarly, a bid submitted at time t = 1 arrives at the end of t = 1 with
probability q ∈ (0, 1]. If the auction does not end at t = 1, and the bid
does not arrive at t = 1, then it arrives at t2(1)14. This is a crucial difference
between the last-minute bid at t = 2 and (possibly) a last-minute bid at
t = 1.
These games are fairly different than the standard second price sealed bid auc-
tion. In particular, similar to the second price eBay-model auction, there are no
dominant strategies in these games15. Furthermore, in these games the set of un-
dominated strategies are rather large. In particular, a strategy with bidding above
own valuation is not necessarily dominated.
Lemma 1. A strategy where player i bids bti > vi at some t ∈ T may not be dominated.
Proof. Let n = 2 (if n > 2, assume all additional bidders do not bid at any time). It
is sufficient to show that for some types of i, bidding bti > vi is better than bidding
bti ≤ vi.
Suppose that bidder j’s strategy is to bid once at t = t1(1) either b
t1(1)
j = vj if
b0i < v˜ for some v˜ ∈ (0, v¯) or to bid bt1(1)j = 0 otherwise. In that case, for all types
14This implies that the other bidders have opportunity to reply to a bid placed at t = 1 with
probability 1− h, i.e. the probability that the auction ends at t = 2.
15The proof of the claim is analogous to that of Theorem (no dominant strategies) on page 301
of Ockenfels and Roth (2006), and hence is omitted here.
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bidding any amount b0i ≥ v˜ yields vi while bidding below v˜ yields vi − vj only
when vi > vj. Thus bidding b0i = v¯ is weakly better than any other bid which is a
strategy that results in bidding above valuation vi, almost surely.
In what follows, we search for equilibria in strategies where bidders do not
bid above their private valuations.
Lemma 2. Every bidder i ∈ N bidding according to the following strategy is an equilib-
rium:
There exists ti ∈ {0} ∪ {t1(m); m = 1, 2, . . . } such that btii = vi and never updates
after ti, i.e. bt
′
i = ∅ for all t
′ > ti.
Proof. Consider a bidder i ∈ N. By bidding bti > vi at any t, she incurs losses
whenever the highest valuation among the other bidders, v−i = maxj∈N\{i}{vj}
satisfies bti > v−i > vi. These losses would be avoided if i were never to bid
higher than vi. Next denote by tˆ−i = maxj∈N\{i}{tj}. This is the time of the last
submitted bid from bidders other than i such that bj = vj. At tˆ−i, bidder i is
faced with one of two situations. She may see that there exists some bidder j 6= i
with value vj > vi, in which case, bidding vi at some time ti < 1 is optimal (by
indifference). Alternatively, i may see that she has the highest value, in which
case it is optimal for her to bid vi at some time ti < 116.
Although the equilibria constructed above includes the standard equilibrium
in weakly dominant strategies of second price sealed bid auctions17, we can see
that there are far more equilibria in our game. They differ in the timing of an-
nouncement of the true valuation, however they are all payoff-equivalent to the
standard Vickrey equilibria. The crucial point is that all players bid their true
valuations at some point ti < 1.
Next, we search for equilibria that display late bidding, and more importantly
sniping. Sniping will be referred to as a situation in which a player places a bid
that can not be retaliated against. In our game, conditional on the game ending
at t = 2, a bid successfully placed at t = 2 is a snipe. Similarly a bid successfully
placed at t = 1 may be a snipe with probability h. We show by construction that
there may exist equilibria with sniping at t = 2 in the presence of a random end-
ing time. Before we state the main result consider the subgame at t = 2.
Lemma 3. If a bidder has not already placed a bid equal to her true valuation before
t = 2, i.e. limm→∞ b
t2(m)
i < vi, then it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid b
2
i = vi.
16Although any bid btii = p ∈ (p−i, vi] where p−i = maxj∈N\{i}{b
tj
j } works, by indifference we
pick btii = vi.
17Namely, all bidders bid b0i = vi and never update at any t > 0.
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Proof. At t = 2, it is common knowledge that the game ends. Given valuations
are private, then under the assumption that all bidders bid up to their respective
valuations, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid b2i = vi. The reasoning follows
that of a standard second price sealed bid auction.
Observe that, despite the fact that a bid is transmitted with q probability at
t = 2, it is nevertheless optimal to bid your true valuation. The reason is that
with non-zero probability what you bid matters. In cases where your bid does
not go through, a player is indifferent to what she bids. However, when her bid
goes through, by bidding below her valuation she is giving up expected rents
regardless, when entering t = 2, whether she is the highest bidder or not18. On
the other hand, since no other bidder bids above their true valuation, bidding
above own valuation yields expected losses whenever the overbid satisfies v−i >
b > vi where v−i = maxj∈N\{i}{vj}.
The main result is as follows.
Theorem 2.1. There may exist symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria where bidders with
valuation above a threshold p ∈ [0, v¯) snipe each other mutually at t = 2 and do not
place any bids in (0, 2).
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the case of 2 bidders. Then the follow-
ing strategies comprise the equilibrium profile. There exists a cutoff bid p ∈ [0, v¯)
such that:
S1. If vi ≤ p, then she bids b0i = vi and never updates after time t = 0, i.e.
bti = ∅ for all t > 0.
S2. If vi ≥ p, then she bids b0i = p at time t = 0. If the opponent has bid b0j < p
then she bids bt1(1)i = vi. Otherwise, she does not update until t = 2, i.e.
bti = ∅ at any t ∈ (0, 2). At t = 2 she bids b2i = vi. If i observes that b0j > p or
btj 6= ∅ at some t ∈ (0, 2), then she bids bt
′
i = vi at the next possible period.
We can also define the beliefs as follows. At time t = 0 beliefs are given by the
ex-ante probability distribution F(v). Then the beliefs are updated at t = t1(1). If
both bidders have bid below p or both have bid p at t = 0 then beliefs remain the
same for the rest of the game in all times t ∈ [t1(1), 2] on the equilibrium path.
Therefore, after the first bids are announced, a bidder i believes that the other
bidder j has a value that is;
• Equal to her bid b0j if b0j < p with certainty, i.e. P(vj = b0j |b0j < p) = 1,
• Distributed according to the conditional distribution between p and v¯ if
b0j = p, i.e. P(p ≤ vj ≤ v|b0j = p) = F(v)−F(p)1−F(p) for some v ∈ [p, v¯].
18To see why, observe that with nonzero probability all players’ last-minute bids go through.
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If i has bid some b0i < p and j had bid b
0
j = p, then on the equilibrium path,
bt1(1)j = vj. Therefore, in that case i updates her belief from the conditional dis-
tribution to a belief where the other bidder j has a value that is equal to her bid
bt1(1)j with certainty, i.e. P(vj = b
t1(1)
j |b0i < p and b0j = p) = 1.
If there are any deviations, i.e. a bid at t ∈ (0, 2) or a bid b0j > p at t = 0, then
beliefs at those out-of-equilibrium nodes put full probability to the deviation;
P(vj = b˜| if b0j = b˜ > p or btj = b˜ 6= ∅ for 0 < t < 2) = 1.
We will verify that the above strategy profile is subgame perfect by backwards
induction. The main point is to show why it is optimal for any bidder i with value
vi > p to not deviate at any any point if she sees that her opponent has bid p at
t = 0.
Let us start by considering bidder i’s strategy when she has vi ≤ p. She be-
lieves that with F(p) probability the other bidder has valuation vj ≤ p, in which
case bidder j bids her true valuation at t = 0. Similarly, with 1− F(p) probability
the opponent has valuation vj > p and bids p at t − 0. For i, bidding above vi
is weakly dominated and creates additional loss making. If she bids below her
valuation, then she could update at any t = t1(m) before 1 and receive the same
payoff. In other words, bidding below her valuation at t = 0 can not yield her
higher payoff at any t > 0. By indifference it is therefore optimal for her to bid
true valuation at the first period, which in turn yields her an expected payoff of:
















Next consider the strategy of bidder i when vi > p. On the equilibrium path,
there are two possibilities. Either i will be faced with an opponent having a valu-
ation below p, which she can infer at the beginning of t = t1(1). In that case, by
indifference it is optimal for i to bid her true valuation at t1(1), since it guarantees
her a payoff of vi − vj where vj ≤ p. Alternatively, i may be faced with an oppon-
ent who also bids p at t = 0 which leads i to believe that vj is distributed in the
[p, v¯] interval with distribution F(v)−F(p)1−F(p) . Let us evaluate under what conditions
it is indeed optimal for i to not update her initial bid of p until the last instance
t = 2.
We know from Lemma 3 that it is optimal for i to bid her true valuation at
t = 2. Since both bidders have bid p at the beginning of the game, one of them
is randomly chosen to be the high bidder19. Therefore, by bidding b2i = vi at the
last instance in a subgame where both i and j’s bids are at p, the expected payoffs
19We will refer to the randomly chosen highest bidder as the leader and the other bidder will be
referred to as the follower.
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to i when she is the leader or the follower are equal to, respectively:
Π2i (vi, vj > p)
L = q2S(vi|vj > p) + (1− q)(vi − p)
Π2i (vi, vj > p)
F = q2S(vi|vj > p) + (1− q)q(vi − p)
where S(vi|vj > p) is the expected information rents conditional on the opponent
also having valuation above p and is equal to:














1− F(p)dv− (vi − p)
F(p)
1− F(p)
Firstly, observe that the expected payoff to the leader, Π2i (vi, vj > p)
L, is strictly
larger than that of the follower. Secondly, in both of the expected payoffs, we
account for the friction of probabilistic bid transmission. In that regard, the ex-
pected payoff has the standard information rents appear only with q2 probabil-
ity, since it is the probability with which both bidders can successfully update
their bids. Similarly, with (1− q)q probability only one of the bidders’ bids goes
through. If indeed only i’s bid goes through, then i wins with certainty having to
pay only p. On the other hand, if it is only j whose bid was updated, then i loses
with certainty earning 0. Finally with (1− q)2 probability, neither bidder’s bid is
updated from p. In that case i gets to keep the whole rent of (vi − p) to herself
only if she is the leader.
Let us now go back one step further and consider a subgame beginning at time
t = t2(m) for some m. We check whether it is possible to sustain an equilibrium
in which no bids are placed before t = 2, whenever the auction has reached
some period t2(m) at price p. If i sticks to the suggested strategy profile then, she
gets an expected payoff given by Π2i (vi, vj > p)
L or Π2i (vi, vj > p)
F depending
on whether she is the leader or the follower, respectively. If i were to deviate
and place a bid (above p) at some t2(m), then j retaliates by bidding her true
valuation. Hence, i’s (weakly) most profitable deviation at t2(m) is to bid her
valuation20. By bidding bt2(m)i = vi, the expected payoff i gets is equal to S(vi|vj >
p), since j retaliates at t2(m + 1) by bidding her valuation hence yielding i her
expected information rent with certainty. One important point to observe is that
the deviation and the reply arrives without any frictions. Then i would rather
delay bidding to t = 2 than deviating if Π2i (vi, vj > p) is weakly larger than
S(vi|vj > p). Since i’s incentives to deviate are higher if she is the follower, it is
20To see why, if she deviates by bidding above vi, after j bids her true valuation, i might find
herself making a loss. Any deviation to some bid between p and vi could eventually be updated
to vi at some later time t2(m′) for m′ > m. In that case, by indifference, we consider a single
deviation to vi at t2(m).
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enough to check only the follower’s inequality:
q2S(vi|vj > p) + (1− q)q(vi − p) ≥ S(vi|vj > p)









The last line gives a condition which should be satisfied for all vi > p. Observe
that the left hand side is linear in vi while the right hand side is strictly convex in
vi.21 Since both sides are positive valued for all vi ∈ (p, v¯] and the right hand side
of the inequality convex, it is sufficient to check whether the inequality is satisfied










Next consider bidder i’s incentives at time t = 1. Remember that, the game
might end at t = 1 with some probability h or continue on until t = 2 with the
remaining probability. If she sticks to the equilibrium strategy, then as a leader
and as a follower she expects to receive, respectively:
Π1i (vi, vj > p)
L = h · (vi − p) + (1− h)
[
q2S(vi|vj > p) + (1− q)(vi − p)
]
Π1i (vi, vj > p)
F = h · 0+ (1− h)
[
q2S(vi|vj > p) + (1− q)q(vi − p)
]
Observe that, again, Π1i (vi, vj > p)
L is strictly larger than Π1i (vi, vj > p). If i
deviates at t = 1 then her bid goes through with probability q successfully at
t = 1, while with remaining probability bid goes through at t2(1). In case the
game does not end at t = 1 and i deviates, then j will learn this with certainty
by the end of t2(1) and retaliate at t2(2) by bidding vj. Now let us evaluate the
expected payoff i accrues from deviating. By deviating at t = 1, i takes two
risks: first, her bid may not go through; second, the auction may not end at t =
1. Given that bidding true valuation is the most profitable deviation due to the
same reasons as before, then the deviation yields an expected payoff equal to
h · q(vi − p) + (1− h)S(vi|vj > p).
In order i not to deviate, her equilibrium path expected payoff must be larger
than or equal to the deviation expected payoff. Again, the incentives to deviate
for the follower are larger as her equilibrium path payoff is smaller. Evaluating
21This is because the first derivative at any vi > p equals F(vi) ≥ 0 and the second derivative
equals f (vi) > 0, ∀vi ∈ [0, v¯].
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the inequality for the follower yields the following condition:
(1− h)
[
q2S(vi|vj > p) + (1− q)q(vi − p)
]
≥ h · q(vi − p) + (1− h)S(vi|vj > p)













Since the right hand side of the last inequality is strictly convex while the left
hand side is linear in vi and that both sides are always positive, it is sufficient to
check that inequality is satisfied for v¯ to imply it holds at all vi ∈ [p, v¯]. This gives














It is immediate to observe that condition (2.3) is implied by the latter condition
(2.4). This is simply because the constant term in the brackets is smaller, making
it is easier for the inequality to be satisfied.
Going further back, at any time t = t1(m), if i sticks to the equilibrium strategy,
then her expected payoff Πt1(m)i (v,vj > p) is equivalent to Π
1
i (vi, vj > p)
L or
Π1i (vi, vj > p)
F depending on whether she is the leader or the follower. On the
other hand, deviating by bidding bt1(m)i at some t1(m) yields her an expected pay-
off of S(vi|vj > p) with certainty. This is different than at t = 1, simply because
at any t1(m) there exists the next period t1(m + 1) where the opponent retali-
ates with certainty. Concentrating on the follower’s incentives, she never finds it
optimal to deviate when the following inequality is satisfied:
(1− h)
[
q2S(vi|vj > p) + (1− q)q(vi − p)
]
≥ S(vi|vj > p)



















)(1− F(p))] ≥ ∫ v¯
p
F(v)dv (2.5)
Simple algebra yields that the constant on the left hand side from the last con-
dition (2.5) is larger than that in condition (2.4). Hence the previous condition
implies condition (2.5) stated above.
Finally let us consider i’s options at t = 0. If she bids p, then with probability
F(p) the opponent has valuation below p in which case she gets vi − vj for sure.
With remaining probability (1− F(p)), opponent also bids p and from there on
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i receives the continuation payoffs22. Combining all of the above, we get that i’s
expected payoff from equilibrium path play at t = 0 is given as follows:










1− (1− h)q2)+ ∫ vi
0
F(v)dv
If i were to deviate at t = 0 by bidding above p, and in particular bidding vi,





On the other hand, if i were to deviate by bidding some b0i = b˜ < p, then the
opponent would bid vj latest by t1(1). To be more precise, if vj < p then b0j = vj,
anyways, and i has no gain in deviating by underbidding at t = 0. If vj > p, on
the other hand, then j initially bids b0j = p. After observing i’s deviation to b˜ < p
at t = 0, the opponent would bid bt1(1)j = vj. In any case, underbidding would
result in i receiving an expected deviation payoff of S(vi), as well. Altogether,
bidder i bids b0i = p only when her equilibrium path expected payoff is larger
than or equal to S(vi). This inequality is shown below:













Since the constant in brackets on the left hand side is even larger than F(p)+q1+q ,
condition (2.4) also implies this last condition, similar to the previous cases.
Therefore the strategy profile described by S1 and S2 along with the beliefs
form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, whenever the parameters of the model sat-














In Theorem 2.1, we have proved that for a given set of parameters q, h and a
given probability distribution F(v), it is possible to have equilibria with a threshold
p ∈ [0, v¯) where bidders with valuations above the threshold mutually snipe each
other at the end of the game. We provided a sufficient condition to have such
equilibria. It was not surprising that the most relevant condition comes from the
no deviation check at period t = 1. The reason is that, a bidder with high valu-
22Note that, if both vi and vj is larger than p, then i becomes the leader or the follower with
equal probability after t = 0, which is accounted for in the continuation payoffs.
23We can think of S(vi) as a special case of S(vi|vj > p) where p = 0. Remember that S(vi|vj >
p) is the expected information rent conditional on the opponent having valuation higher than
some p. When p = 0 it is simply equivalent to the unconditional expected rent.
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ation (higher than p) has the most incentives to deviate at t = 1 when he is faced
with another bidder who has bid p at t = 0 and has not updated her bid. A de-
viation at t = 1, if succesful, will generate a big surplus whenever t = 1 is the
terminal node. Deviation at any other period, however, will be retaliated against
with certainty. Therefore, it is sufficient to make sure that high valuation bidders
will not want to deviate even at t = 1 which is equivalent to the condition (2.4)
being satisfied.
Several remarks are in order regarding the equilibrium threshold bid, p. Firstly,
observe that in the characterization of sniping equilibria, we exclude v¯ from the
set of possible threshold values. The reason is that for any set of parameters
and any probability distribution, the threshold p = v¯ is always an equilibrium.
However there is no sniping occuring in those equilibria as they are simply those
where all bidders bid their true valuations at t = 024. This is not surprising, as it
is a special case of those equilibria characterized in Lemma 2, where ti = 0, and
hence b0i = vi, for all i ∈ N.
Secondly, it may be the case that there are multiple values p’s that satisfy the
equilibrium condition (2.4). Let us denote by P = {p ∈ [0, v¯]|(2.4) is satisfied.}.
Then, it is ambiguous which of those multiple equilibria would be played. One
intuitive selection argument would be to pick p∗ ∈ P which maximizes the ex-
pected ex-ante payoff of a bidder25. Let us denote by Πi, the ex-ante expected




































1− (1− h)q2)] dF(vi)






























2 . Any p ∈ P that satisfies the first order condition is a local
24Only bidders with valuation vi ≤ p = v¯ bid p at t = 0 and then snipe each other mutually at
t = 2. However probability of are having a bidder with valuation above v¯ is 0 which implies that
there is no sniping occuring in such an equilibrium.
25Ex-ante is used in the sense of before t = 0, i.e. before bidders learn their true valuation.
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Below we provide a numeric example where we have equilibria as per The-
orem 2.1:
Example 1. Consider the private valuations to be drawn over the support [0, 1] (i.e.
v¯ = 1) according to the distribution F(v) = v2. Let q 34 and h =
1
25 . Then we can only

























⇐⇒ (1− p)(1− 13p) ≥ 0
Hence P = [0, 1/13]. In other words, there may be a sniping equilibrium for any p ∈
[0, 1/7]. If we consider equilibrium selection, then we can see the first derivative of Πi
























<0 for all p∈[0,1) and =0 when p=1
Since the FOC holds only at p = 1, evaluating the second derivative, we get d
2Π
dp2 |p=1 = 0
which implies that p = 1 is not a local maximum. On the other hand the first derivative of
Πi is negative for the remaining range of p values. Among all other candidate thresholds
p ∈ P = [0, 1/7], the ex-ante expected payoff is at a maximum when p = 0. In other
words, it is best for a bidder from an ex-ante point of view, that all the bidders “collude”
at lowest price and snipe each other mutually at the end of the game.
2.4.1 Comparative Statics
We now analyse the robustness of the sniping equilibria with respect to the para-
meters of our model, namely q and h. We have already established in The-
orem 2.1, that in our model existence of sniping equilibria depends on a particular
condition given by (2.4). For a given probability distribution F(v) and threshold
price p, we investigate whether it is more or less likely for sniping equilibria to
exist, by varying the parameters q and h. In the exercises below, we assume that
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F(v) and p are such that they satisfy the condition (2.4) for some values of the
parameters and we investigate how the inequality in the condition changes in
the parameters.
The two parameters h and q matter for existence of sniping equilibria. When
the value of parameter h varies, the only term in condition (2.4) that changes is
the constant inside the brackets. Taking the first derivative of the term in brackets














1− h)2(1− q2) < 0
Hence as h increases, the term in brackets from condition (2.4) gets smaller, in
turn making it harder for the sniping equilibrium to be satisfied, all else equal.
The intuition is clear; the higher is h, the more likely it becomes that the game
ends at the end of period t = 1. Therefore, the more tempting it becomes to
deviate and bid at some time t ∈ (0, 1]. In particular, remember that we evaluated
the condition using the expected payoffs of a follower on the equilibrium path
and a follower receives a payoff of 0 if the game were to end at t = 1. Then it
is very sensible that a follower would experience a rise in incentives to deviating
when probability of game ending at t = 1 becomes larger.
Another important point is that the condition is easiest to satisfy when h = 0
at which value the term in the brackets takes the largest value. Note that the
special case in which h = 0 represents a hard close ending. Therefore, we can
argue that introducing random ending time lowers the incentives of collusive
sniping equilibria, merely from the fact that it is harder for those equilibria to be
sustained when h > 0.
Next, let us consider the parameter q, which represents the sniping friction at
periods t = 1 and t = 2. When the value of parameter q changes, we have a dif-























We can observe that the derivative may take both positive and negative val-
ues. Furthermore, if h < 12 or that it is more likely for the auction to end at t = 2,
then the constant in brackets from Condition (2.4) achieves a maximum at some
q∗ ∈ (0, 1) or an intermediary value26. This implies that the impact of q is non-
monotonic.
We can summarise the intuition as follows. When q is too low (below q∗), the
26To see why, the constant evaluated at q = 0 is positive, and it has a strictly positive derivative.
Also as q approaches 1, the constant in brackets approaches −∞.
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last minute mutual snipes are very imprecise. A bidder who enters t = 2 as a
follower has to sacrifice some of the surplus in order to maintain lower prices.
The less precise snipes are, the more are the potential surplus losses. On the
other hand, if q is too high (above q∗), then the contrary is true. Since the snipes
are very precise, there are less gains from waiting27. Therefore, it becomes harder
to sustain sniping equilibria all else equal.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter analysed auctions with a random ending time. We first established
the following stylised facts about bidding behaviour in ComprasNet auctions
with a random close: (i) bidders defer bidding to the end phase of the auction; (ii)
a sizeable fraction of auctions is resolved “early”; (iii) bid increments are typically
small; and (iv) large increments are more likely to occur early in the auction. We
then developed a model to rationalise these observed patterns in the data.
Our findings imply that, contrary to the intentions of those who designed the
ComprasNet rules, ending the auction at random does not prevent late-bidding.
Bidders actively use the last minutes of the auction, outbidding previous bids
by tiny amounts. We observe that, when the auction duration is randomly ex-
tended, the winning bid decreases significantly. This in turn may explain why
ComprasNet decided to change its algorithm to allow for more bidding time.
However, by changing the ending rule, ComprasNet also changed bidders’ time
incentives, who again use the last minutes of the auction to bid. We now conclude
with some conjectures and directions for future research.
One likely consequence of ending an auction at random is that it is not ex-post
efficient: the allocation is essentially decided randomly among bidders actively
engaged in late bidding. Taking entry and bid history as given, this is also a
source of concern for revenues: if given more time, bidders would carry on out-
bidding each other, thus decreasing price. However, the introduction of random-
ness in the final allocation might give weak bidders better chances of winning the
auction. If entry is costly, such uncertainty encourages weak bidders to particip-
ate in the auction. The positive effect of increased participation thus mitigates,
and may even outweigh, the negative effect on revenues conditional on entry.
One alternative policy is to introduce a proxy-bidding system, similar to that
of eBay. Again, it is not clear whether bidders would place their best bids early on
the auction, as the eBay experience teaches us. However it would allow bidders
the option of placing their best bid at the outset without having to worry about
over-bidding. In essence, a proxy-bidding system would reduce monitoring costs
27Remember that the gain for a high value bidder who enters t = 2 as a follower in a sniping
equilibrium is the possibility of only her bid going through at t = 2 which guarantees her the
purchase at low price.
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for bidders – that is, the cost of time spent on closely following the auction until
it closes.
These conjectures call for further inquiry. Experimental evidence can be par-
ticularly useful for deciding on potential changes to the design of the bidding
platform, such as the introduction of a proxy-bidding system.
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Chapter 3
A comparison between offline and
online auctions
Abstract
This chapter analyses offline auctions held in ComprasNet. Offline
auctions were common in the early days of ComprasNet, when the
online bidding software was not fully developed. These offline auc-
tions have a two-stage design. Two-stage designs have long been
proposed by the theoretical literature, but there is virtually no em-
pirical work analysing data from such designs apart from experi-
mental studies. I first present a stylised model of bidding in a two-
stage auction similar to that used by ComprasNet. I then explore
bidding behaviour in offline auctions and confront the predictions
of the model with the data. The model is currently unsatisfactory, as
it fails to capture some key features of the data. I discuss possible
modifications of the model to rationalize observed bidding beha-
viour. I then compare online and offline auctions in terms of their
outcomes, taking advantage of a change in regulation that required
purchasing units to use online auctions. This change introduces exo-
genous variation on the choice of the auction format, which can be
used to identify the effects of auction rules on outcomes. I find that
offline auctions attract substantially fewer bidders than online auc-
tions and that this results in higher procurement costs. The analysis
however cannot disentangle the effects of auction rules from those
of the way the auction is held (online vs. offline).
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3.1 Introduction
There is a growing literature on two-stage auctions that combine features of dif-
ferent standard formats (e.g., Ye (2007), Ho¨rner and Sahuguet (2007), Perry and
Reny (2002)). Two-stage designs have a wide range of applications. For example,
Perry et al. (2000) and Dutra and Menezes (2002) observe that a number of privat-
isation processes of state-owned companies in Italy and Brazil were auctioned off
using two-stage designs, while Ye (2007) documents widespread use of two-stage
auctions in the context of high-valued assets in the US electricity generation in-
dustry. Moreover, some authors argue that two-stage auctions can improve on
standard designs in certain contexts. For example, Klemperer (1998) proposed
a two-stage design in the context of airwaves auctions, where standard auction
formats faced the trade-off between efficient network formation and maximizing
revenue.
Some ComprasNet auctions use a two-stage auction design as an alternative
to the standard online format discussed in the previous two chapters. In the first
stage, bidders submit (binding) sealed bids. A qualifying rule selects the best
bids from the first stage stage. In the second stage, qualified bidders engage in
an ascending auction in which the minimum bid is set at the best bid submitted
in the first stage. These auctions are held offline and were mostly used when the
online bidding platform was not yet ready for large-scale utilisation. The offline,
two-stage format uses a unique design closely related to the Dutch-Anglo auction
proposed by Klemperer (1998). To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies
using data for this type of auction.
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, I present a stylised model of
bidding in a two-stage auction similar to the one used in ComprasNet. I then
explore bidding behaviour in offline auctions, and confront the predictions of the
model with the data. The model is currently unsatisfactory, as it fails to capture
some key features of the data. I discuss possible modifications of the model to
rationalise observed bidding behaviour.
Second, I estimate the impact that the two auction formats have on auction
outcomes. I take advantage of a change in regulation that required purchasing
units to use online auctions. This change introduces exogenous variation in the
choice of the auction format, which can be used to identify the effects of auction
rules on outcomes. I find that offline auctions attract substantially fewer bidders
than online auctions and that this results in higher procurement costs. One key
challenge when comparing the online and offline formats is to disentangle the
effects of the medium–online or offline–from those of the auction rules.
This chapter contributes to the literature on two-stage auction designs. Two-
stage designs have received considerable attention from the theoretical literature
(e.g., Ye (2007), Ho¨rner and Sahuguet (2007), Perry and Reny (2002)), but empir-
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ical analysis has been restricted to experimental studies (Kagel et al. (2008)). To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study using field data generated by a
two-stage auction design.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
mechanism used in offline auctions and present a model of these auctions. Sec-
tion 3.3 gives some background on the usage of offline auctions in ComprasNet,
and describes the data used. Section 3.4 presents results of reduced form regres-
sions that test for differences in auction outcomes between online and offline auc-
tions. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Offline Auction Mechanism
In this section I describe how offline auctions work in ComprasNet. The online
format was extensively described in Chapter 2 and will be referred to here for
comparison purposes only. I also focus on the auction game itself, as the environ-
ment surrounding the auction game was described in section 1.3.
• Stage 1: Bidders submit a (binding) sealed bid before a pre-specified dead-
line, after which no bidders may enter the auction.1 After receiving bids
from all participants, the auctioneer opens the sealed bids and orders them.
All bids become common knowledge to all participants.
• Qualifying Rule: All bids no greater than 10% of the best (i.e., lowest) bid
qualify for Round 2; if there are less than 3 bids in this situation, the best 3
bids qualify for Round 2.
• Stage 2: Qualified bidders can now verbally call new bids. Bidding starts
from the highest (i.e., worst) qualified bid, followed by the 2nd highest and
so forth. There is an activity rule: if a bidder skips her turn, she withdraws
from the auction and cannot return. All bids must be strictly smaller than
any previous bids. In particular, the first bid placed in Round 2 must be
smaller than the low bid of Round 1. Bidding ends when there is only one
bidder who has not quit. The winner pays her last bid. If no bidders wish
to place new bids in Round 2, the low bidder in Round 1 wins the auction
and pays her bid.
Example Figure 3.1 illustrates one typical physical auction. Six bidders entered
this auction, as indicated in Round 1. The auctioneer opens the envelopes and
ranks the bids. The low bid in Round 1 came from Bidder C, $63, 000. According
to the qualifying rule, all bids up to $63, 000× 1.1 = $69, 300 qualify for Round
1Sometimes, the deadline coincides with bidders arriving at the bidding room.
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2. There are no bids in this range, so the bottom 3 bids (i.e., bidders A, B and C)
qualify. Bidder A placed the highest Round 1 bid among the qualified bids, so
she is the first one to bid in Round 2. She must either bid lower than $63, 000 or
quit. She bids $62, 000. Next, it’s B’s turn. The auction goes on this way until C
decides to withdraw. The next one to withdraw is bidder A, so B wins and pays
her last bid, $51, 900.
Figure 3.1 A typical offline auction




1 A 90.00 X
1 B 75.24 X











2 C Gives up
2 A 51.99
2 B 51.90
2 A Gives up
Discussion In both online and offline auctions bidders submit a sealed bid and
then engage in a descending auction. But the two formats differ in three key re-
spects, each of which can have implications for bidding behaviour and auction
outcomes. First, all bidders must be physically present at a public meeting in off-
line auctions. Participation costs are thus likely to be greater. More information
is revealed to bidders, since bidders learn all the bids placed and the respect-
ive identity of other bidders. In contrast, bidders in online auctions only learn
the current low bid. Under the IPV framework this difference should not matter
for bidding behaviour, but combined with other information structures such dif-
ference may translate into different bidding behaviours across formats. Second,
offline auctions have a qualifying rule which is absent in online auctions. This
qualifying rule is what makes the offline format a two-stage auction game. It cre-
ates a trade-off between the probability that a bidder qualifies for Stage 2 and the
price she will have to pay in case she wins the auction. As a result, bidders must
be “careful” with their opening bids, as they may not have a chance to revise
them. In contrast, online auctions the opening bid can always be revised. Third,
offline auctions also have an activity rule. The activity rule reveals the drop out
points of each bidder, up to bid increments. This has implications to how the data
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on loosing bids can be interpreted.
3.2.1 A Model of Offline Auctions
Consider the following auction game. N risk-neutral bidders bid for a single ob-
ject. Bidders have independent private values: bidders’ i valuation is vi ∼ F(v),
with support [vL, vH], and vi is independent from {vj}i 6=j. All this is common
knowledge. The auction has two stages. The rules are as follows:
• Stage 1: Bidders submit a sealed bid. Denote a bid submitted in Stage 1 by
bi, and the highest bid by b(1), the second highest by b(2), and so on. Let
k ∈ (0, 1). All bids in [kb(1), b(1)] qualify to Stage 2. If there are less than 3
bids [kb(1), b(1)], the best 3 bids qualify to Stage 2.
• Stage 2: All bids from Stage 1 are revealed. Qualified bidders play an Eng-
lish “button” auction; they can choose to update their bids, or to maintain
their Stage 1 bids. If they choose to update, their bid must be no lesser than
the high bid from Stage 1. If no bidders choose to update their bids, the
high bidder from Round 1 wins the auction and pays his bid.
The next two propositions show that there is no symmetric, strictly increasing
equilibrium bidding function Stage 1. I assume throughout that in Stage 2 players
use the weakly dominant strategy of bidding up to their valuations.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose b is an equilibrium bidding function in Stage 1, and that
b′ > 0. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem must hold.
Proof. Since b′ > 0, the high-valuation bidder goes to Stage 2 and wins the auction
with probability 1; a bidder with valuation v has an expected payoff of zero, since
she only wins when all her opponents have valuation v, and in that case she must
bid v. Therefore the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose b is an equilibrium bidding function in Stage 1, and that
b′ > 0. If b(x) > v for any x, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem cannot hold
Proof. Without loss of generality, denote bidder 1’s valuation by x and the highest
valuation of the remaining N − 1 bidders by YN−11 . Since b′ > 0, the high-
valuation bidder goes to Stage 2 and wins the auction. So bidder 1 wins if and
only if x > YN−11 . If she wins, she pays the maximum between her Stage 1 bid
and the highest valuation among her opponents. Hence we can write bidder 1’s
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expected payment as
m(x) =E[max b(x), Y1|x ≥ Y1]× Pr[x ≥ Y1]
=b(x)Pr[b(x) ≥ Y1|x ≥ Y1]× Pr[x ≥ Y1]





where G1(t) = Pr[Y1 ≤ t] and g1 = G′1. By Proposition 3.1, the Revenue Equival-









⇐⇒ b′(x)G1(b(x)) + b(x)g1(b(x))b′(x)+
+ xg1(x)− b(x)g1(b(x))b′(x) = xg1(x), ∀x
⇐⇒ b′(x)G1(b(x)) = 0 ∀x
The first line makes it clear that for the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to hold,
we must have b(x) < x, i.e., bidders cannot bid more than their valuation in Stage
1. The second line is obtained by differentiating both side of the preceding line.
The last line says that for the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to hold, we must
have either that b′ = 0, which contradicts the assumption that b is monotonic
increasing, or G1(b(x)) = 0, which means b(x) < v.
To sum up, b′ > 0 and b(x) ≥ v together imply a contradiction (the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem must hold and cannot hold). Therefore we conclude that
there is no symmetric, strictly increasing equilibrium bidding function Stage 1.
However, the next proposition demonstrates that there can be symmetric equilib-
ria so long as bidders bid below v.
Proposition 3.3. Any b ≤ v is an equilibrium bidding function in Stage 1.
Proof. If all bidders bid the same amount, they all go to Stage 2. The outcome
of the auction is the same of the “button” auction of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
A downward deviation in Stage 1 does not increase the probability of winning
the auction, nor reduces the expected payment. An upward deviation only in-
creases the expected payment, and does not increase the probability of winning.
Therefore it does not pay to deviate.
Remark 1 The symmetric equilibria in which all bidders in Stage 1 bid below
the low valuation are fragile in two respects. First, although trembling hand per-
fectness is not formally defined in this game, there is a sense in which bidding the
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low valuation (say, zero) in the first stage does not satisfy the concept of trembling
hand perfectness. This is especially relevant in the context of ComprasNet be-
cause “bidding zero” is not defined: ComprasNet auctions are descending auctions
and there is no maximum bid permitted. Second, while these equilibria survive
deviations from one bidder, they do not survive deviations from more than two
bidders. That is, a coalition of bidders would have strong incentives to deviate by
a little amount in Stage 1, and exclude all other bidders from competing in Stage
2.
Remark 2 One way of getting a symmetric increasing equilibrium in Stage 1 is
to assume that updating the bids between the two stages is costly: in a limiting
case where updating the bids is infinitely costly, no bidder will update and the
game reduces to a first-price auction. However, it is not clear how to interpret
such costs in our empirical setting. It is worth noting that other researchers (De-
carolis (2010), Ye (2007)) have documented the use of auction mechanisms that
also lack symmetric increasing equilibrium bidding strategies.
3.3 Background and Data
3.3.1 Background
Since its inception in 2001, ComprasNet had the long-term view of utilizing com-
munication technology to improve the government’s purchasing system. To that
end, the government commissioned an online bidding platform. An alpha ver-
sion of the platform was put in operation in 2001, but it needed fixes and was not
ready for large-scale utilisation. As a result, few purchasing units used it; most
purchasing units using reverse auctions chose the offline format. In 2005, as the
online platform was ready for large-scale utilisation, purchasing units were man-
dated to use ComprasNet auctions. They were also required to used the online
format, although the offline format remained available. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
impacts of the 2005 regulation on the relative use of online and offline auctions.
As described in Section 3.2 offline ComprasNet auctions follow a two-stage
design. Why such a special design? There are two answers to this question. First,
this design was borrowed from the experiences of one particular autonomous
government agency which used this design since the 1990s.2. Second, govern-
ment officials were concerned with the possibility of collusion in offline auctions.
The fact that bidders physically gather in a room increases the chances of commu-
nication among them. The first-round, they argue, was meant to mitigate the risk
of collusion by giving bidders an incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement.
2The Ageˆncia Nacional de Telecomunicac¸o˜es, or ANATEL, had autonomy to use its own procure-
ment methods.
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In online auctions, government officials perceived such risks to be reduced, and
decided to abolish the qualifying rule.
The choice of auction format can therefore be linked to these concerns. If it
is true that offline auctions may benefit certain groups of firms, it is also likely
that corrupt procurement officials may choose this format to favour those firms.
Moreover, there may be cases in which the choice of format is not related to collu-
sion and/or corruption concerns, but rather to some unobservable characteristic
(to the researcher) that make one auction format better suited. Because of these
concerns, I take advantage from the fact that the timing of regulation requiring
the use of the online format was driven by the technical conditions of the online
bidding platform. While the offline format did not cease to be used, the regula-
tion had a significant (negative) impact on the probability that the offline format
is used, as evidenced by Figure 3.2.
3.3.2 Data
I focus on auctions between December 2004 and April 2006. The choice is based
on the following four arguments. First, ending rules for online auctions have
changed over time (see section 2.2). Restricting the sample avoids dealing with
different flavours of online auctions. Second, unobserved factors may drive the
choice for the offline format years after the 2005 legislation. Selecting auctions
63
around the date of the policy change minimises such concerns. Third, other
policy changes after 2006 were more likely to affect online auctions, thus intro-
ducing confounding factors in the comparison between the formats. Finally, be-
cause of data collection issues, there are many incomplete data points prior to
December 2004, especially for offline auctions. I therefore avoid ending with data
spanning different periods for the different auction formats by disregarding data
from before December 2004.
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample used in this chapter.
Overall, the table suggests that there are substantial differences between the two
auction institutions. Normalised winning bids are 1.3 percentage points higher
in offline auctions (p-value< 0.001) and offline auctions attract less bidders than
online auctions (3.7 vs 5.1, p-value< 0.001). Finally, the third row shows what
is known as the “money left on the table”–the percentage difference between the
best (winning) bid and the runner up bid. This measure captures the dispersion in
private information among bidders. Offline auctions display on average a much
higher “money left on the table” than online auctions.
The last two rows of table 3.1 report statistics for two bid-level variables. The
second-to-last row reports normalised opening bids, defined as bidder’ stage 1
bids normalised by the lot’s reserve price. The table shows that bidders tend
to place more aggressive opening bids in offline auctions: the average opening
bid in offline auctions is 14.3 percent below the reserve price, whereas in online
auctions it is 1.4 percent above the reserve price. The last row shows by how much
bidders update their bids between their opening and final bids. Over the course
the auction, bidders revise their bids substantially more in the online than offline
(9.8 percent and 4.3 percent).
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Bidding in Two Stages
The qualifying rule in offline auctions creates a trade-off between the probability
that a bidder qualifies for Stage 2 and the price she will have to pay in case she
wins the auction. In contrast, online auctions do not have this qualifying rule,
and bidders have nothing to fear by submitting higher opening bids. If there are
no costs in updating bids, one should expect opening bids in online auctions to be
lower than opening bids in offline auctions. This also implies that the difference
between a bidder’s opening bid and her final bid should be greater in online
auctions. To capture the extent to which the qualifying rule affects the opening
bid, I run regressions of the form
yit = βOfflinet + xtγ+ αi + εit, (3.2)
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Online Offline
Mean Std. Dev # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev # of Obs.
Auction-level Variables
Log Winbid 5.742 2.215 353,906 6.800 2.414 68,199
Log Reserve 6.065 2.209 388,243 7.152 2.376 74,769




0.111 0.246 345,576 0.174 0.285 65,160
# of Bidders 5.079 4.545 388,243 3.684 3.247 74,769
Bid-level Variables




0.098 0.176 1,804,433 0.043 0.095 163,270
Notes: table reports statistics for auctions held between December 2004 and April 2006. Auctions for
which the reservation price is not observed are dropped from the sample. (a) If only one bidder enters
the auction or if the second best bid is above the reserve price, the reserve price is used instead of the
second best bid. (b) In offline auctions, bid update is only defined for bidders who qualified for stage 2.
where yit is either the (normalised) first-stage bid of bidder i in auction t or her
update between her opening and final bids; offline equals 1 if auction t is held
offline, xt is a vector of auction characteristics, αi is a bidder-specific effect, and
εit is an error term satisfying the usual assumptions. I experiment with treating
αi as a bidder fixed-effect or random-effect, as well as different auction controls.
The results are in Table 3.2. Columns (1) and (2) imply that the bidders submit
more aggressive opening bids in offline auctions. On average, opening bids are
13 percent lower in offline auctions. After controlling for bidder fixed-effects,
this figure remains at 9.7 percent. Columns (3) and (4) present results for the
normalised difference of bidders’ opening and final bids. The results suggest that
bidders are less aggressive in offline auctions when updating their bids.
3.4.2 Revenues and Participation
The theoretical model presented in section 3.2 gives little predictions regarding
differences in participation and revenues across the online and offline formats.
As argued in the literature, it is likely offline auction have higher entry costs,
reducing participation. In a independent private value framework, this should
lead to lower revenues (higher procurement costs) on average. If bidders incur
those entry costs after they learn their valuation, as in Samuelson (1985), then
negative effect of reduced entry is mitigated by the fact that entry selects bidders
with higher valuations.
The ideal experiment to assess the impact of auction formats on outcomes,
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Table 3.2: Effect of Auction Format on Stage 1 bids
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Opening Bid Opening Bid Update Update
Offline -.131∗∗∗ -.097∗∗∗ -.075∗∗∗ -.057∗∗∗
(.001) (.002) (.000) (.001)
Log Reserve -.030∗∗∗ -.035∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Bidder F.E. No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,987,468 1,336,452 2,169,316 1,470,803
R2 .043 .025 .028 .017
Notes: opening bids are normalized by the reserve price. Update is the difference between
a bidder’s opening and final bid, normalized by the opening bid. Specifications with bidder
fixed-effects include only bidders who bid in both online and offline auctions. All specifica-
tions include controls for year; quarter of year; state; and subcategory (4-digit code). Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
would be to randomly assign formats to auctions, and then measure the differ-
ences in procurement costs and participation across the formats. I am unaware of
any purchasing units following a similar strategy, although this may be possible.3
To illustrate the empirical challenge we face, consider estimating the following
equation:
yt =βOfflinet + xtγ+ εt, (3.3)
where yt is the outcome of interest (winning bid or number of bidders) in auction
t and Offlinet indicates whether auction t is held offline. The vector xt contains
auction characteristics which determine outcomes (geographic location, lots’ re-
serve price, etc). The term εt represents unobserved auction characteristics that
determine auction outcomes. If the choice of auction format is correlated with
any of such characteristics, Cov(εt, Offlinet) 6= 0, making the OLS estimator for β
inconsistent.
To overcome these concerns, I take advantage of the policy change occurring
in July 2005 that required purchasing units to use the online format. As argued
in section 3.3, the timing of the change was driven by the suitability of the online
platform. I therefore take the variation in the format choice induced by the policy
as exogenous. In other words, I use a dummy for the period starting in July 2005
as an instrument for the choice of auction format.
3It is important to note that even such an experiment would not enable us to disentangle the
effects of participation costs and differences in auction rules, as these two features are perfectly
confounded with the auction format. To isolate the effect of the auction rules, the experiment
would announce an auction, and ask interested bidders to submit two bids–one for each auction
format. Then, randomize the auction format and consider only the appropriate bids.
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The validity of this strategy relies on the assumption that there are no con-
founding factors over time that affect procurement costs and participation. The
fact that ComprasNet has expanded over time might make it more attractive for
suppliers. As a result, there may be an increase in participation over time that is
not directly related to the choice of auction format. I use time trends to alleviate
these concerns.
Table 3.3: Results
Offline Norm. Winning Bid # of Bidders
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
AfterJuly05 -.391∗∗∗
(.002)
Offline .022∗∗∗ .082∗∗∗ -2.351∗∗∗ -4.907∗∗∗
(.001) (.003) (.016) (.050)
N 463,012 422,105 422,105 463,012 463,012
R2 .285 .082 .075 .305 .268
Notes: the first column shows first-stage regression results. The other columns show OLS and 2SLS results for
each dependent variable. All regressions include controls for the log of reserve price, a quadratic time trend, and
dummies for 4-digit codes and states.
Table 3.3 presents the results. The first column reports the results of a lin-
ear probability model for the choice of auction format. This is the first-stage re-
gression of our IV strategy. As expected, the probability that the offline format
is chosen drops significantly (39 percentage points) after July 2005. The third
column in implies that the offline format increases procurement costs by 8.2 per-
cent. The OLS results displayed in the second column however put this figure at
2.2 percent. One interpretation for this result is that purchasing units base their
choice of auction format on unobservable factors (to the researcher) that decrease
procurement costs. The fourth and fifth columns report the results for the num-
ber of bidders entering the auctions. As expected, offline auctions attract fewer
bidders than the online format. The IV estimates imply that offline auctions have
5 fewer bidders than online auctions.
3.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I analysed an offline version of ComprasNet auctions. The offline
format follows a two-stage design. In the first stage, bidders submit sealed bids.
A qualifying rule selects the best bids from Stage 1. In Stage 2, qualified bidders
play an open-cry auction. I find differences in bid behaviour vis-a`-vis online auc-
tions, which do not have this qualifying rule. As expected, opening bids are more
aggressive in offline auctions. However, final bids are less aggressive. Taking ad-
vantage of a change in regulation that required purchasing units to use online
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auctions, I find that, on average, offline auctions result in prices 8 percent higher
than online auctions and that offline auctions attract, on average 5 fewer bidders
than online auctions. The effect on the number of participants is consistent with
the conjecture that offline auctions have higher participation costs.
The analysis in this chapter can be improved and extended in a number of
ways. First, the analysis of section 3.4.2 could be improved by using cross-section
variation in the identification of effects of auction format. For example, if the pace
of adoption of the online format varied across cities or Public Bodies, and if that
variation is due to factors not related to auction outcomes directly, then one could
use this extra variation for estimating the desired effects. Useful variation how-
ever depends on institutional detail, and may not be availability in the present
setting.
Second, the model presented in section 3.2 lacks an increasing equilibrium in
Stage 1 bidding strategies. The trade-off created by the qualifying rule however,
suggest that bidders should weight the probability that they will not qualify for
Stage 2. Perhaps more importantly, the data suggests that Stage 1 bids are in-
formative about Stage 2 bids. The existence of increasing equilibria is not de-
sirable from a theoretical perspective, but also important for structural analysis
of auction games. By appropriately modifying the theoretical model, future re-
search will be able to carry a structural estimation of the offline auction game,
thus recovering the primitives of the model.
There are other avenues that future research can explore. The distinction
between online and offline, as well as the role of geography, is underexplored in
the current version of this chapter. Economists have debated about the impacts of
electronic commerce. It is commonly argued that web-based technologies reduce
trade frictions (Brown and Goolsbee (2002)) and product differentiation through
geographic location (Ellison and Ellison (2005)), leading to a more competitive
environment. For example, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) find that price compar-
ison websites helped to reduce insurance prices and price dispersion, and con-
clude that the internet had significant impacts on market competition in the life
insurance industry. On the other hand, Hortac¸su et al. (2009) show that while
eBay increased the geographical distance of transactions, it has not eliminated
the “home bias”. Thus, local firms (sellers) still enjoy some market power.
In ComprasNet, geographic location is arguably the only source of differenti-
ation across bidders, since competition is strictly on prices. While bidders closely
located to buyers will still enjoy costs advantages on online auctions, such ad-
vantages are certainly greater in offline auctions. Future research could investig-
ate whether price dispersion across different geographic locations has fallen with
the introduction of online auctions, contributing to the debate about the impact





In this chapter, we analyse the effects of a bid preference programme
targeting small and micro enterprises (SMEs) in ComprasNet auc-
tions. The programme consists of setting aside eligible lots for fa-
voured firms by restricting the participation by non-favoured firms.
We first provide reduced-form evidence on the effects of the pro-
gramme, taking advantage of the criteria used to restrict participa-
tion. These criteria are based on lots’ reserve prices and provide dis-
continuities in the probability of treatment, allowing us to make use
of them as a source of exogenous variation to identify the effects of
the programme. We find that restricting participation of large firms
has little effect on prices, while it increases participation of small
firms. This finding is consistent with a model of bidder asymmetry
and costly participation. In such a model, restricting participation by
large, strong bidders increases the incentives of small, weak bidders
to participate thus mitigating the adverse effects of the restriction
on prices. We then set up a structural model to estimate entry costs
and simulate the effects of using different criteria to set aside lots.




Bid preference programmes have attracted economists’ attention for at least three
reasons. First, such programmes are ubiquitous in public procurement, and as
such they potentially have large distributional effects. According to Krasnokut-
skaya and Seim (2011) 20 percent of US federal government procurement dollars
in 2006 went to favoured firms. Second, preference programmes, and affirmat-
ive actions more generally, provide a good testing ground for economic theory.
The theory predicts that both favoured and unfavored agents’ incentives change.
With the appropriate data, researchers can test the extent to which those incent-
ives change, and the implications of those changes. Finally, affirmative action is a
controversial political issue due to its distributional impacts, and unknown over-
all effects. Pinning down the costs and benefits of such policies is important to
guide public debate and inform policy making.
In procurement auctions, bid preference programmes usually take one of two
forms. The most common approach is to give targeted firms a bid subsidy. For
example, a subsidy of 5 percent equates a $105 bid from a favoured bidder to a
$100 bid from an unfavored bidder for purposes of determining the wining bid.
The winner, however, is paid the amount of her bid. The other alternative is to
set aside some lots by restricting participation to favoured firms. The effects of
both bid subsidies and set-asides depend on the auction rules, the extent to which
bidders are asymmetric and auction participation costs.
At first glance, both policies would appear to increase procurement costs as
they tend to select weaker bidders. But handicapping a group of bidders may
be optimal for the auctioneer. For example, in a first-price auction with asym-
metric bidders, McAfee and McMillan (1989) show that there is an optimal bid
subsidy to weak bidders that make unfavored (strong) bidders bid more aggress-
ively, minimizing procurement costs to the auctioneer. In a set-aside, restricting
participation of strong bidders gives weak bidders extra incentives to participate.
Procurement costs may therefore decrease if the absence of the strong bidders
is compensated by an increase in the number of favoured bidders (Athey et al.
(2011a)).
This paper analyses the effects of a set aside programme targeting small and
micro enterprises (SMEs) in Brazil.1 We use data from ComprasNet, the online
bidding platform used by the Brazilian federal government for procurement of
various goods and services. In 2010, 50% of all procurement for the federal gov-
ernment was conducted through ComprasNet, totalling R$ 27 billion, or 0.7% of
Brazil’s GDP. Since the start of the set-aside programme in 2007, the government
restricted participation to SMEs in 17% of the lots procured in ComprasNet, cor-
1We deliberately use the acronym SME for small and micro enterprises, instead of the usual
“small and medium enterprises”.
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responding to 3% of procurement dollars.
We first provide reduced-form evidence on the effects of the programme. We
find that restricting participation of large firms has little effect on prices, while
it increases participation of small firms. This finding is consistent with a model
of bidder asymmetry and costly participation. In such a model, restricting parti-
cipation of large, strong bidders increases the incentives of small, weak bidders
to participate thus mitigating the adverse effects of the restriction on prices. To
estimate entry costs, we then set up a structural model of open auctions with
asymmetric bidders and costly participation. The models’ estimates also allows
us to simulate the effects of using different criteria to set aside lots.
Interpretation of entry costs vary across empirical works on endogenous par-
ticipation in auctions. In the context of ComprasNet, we argue that the oppor-
tunity cost of participating in the auction and, more importantly, red-tape costs
are the main components of entry costs. Despite the government’s efforts to re-
duce red-tape in public procurement, interested bidders still have to fill forms,
provide documentation and fulfil a number of formal procedures. In other em-
pirical settings, such features may be negligible when compared to other com-
ponents of entry costs. For example, in timber auctions bidders must perform
(costly) cruises to assess the value of a tract (see Athey et al., 2011b), and in road
construction auctions, bid preparation is a costly activity that requires hours of
work from skilled personnel (see Krasnokutskaya and Seim, 2011).2 In a typ-
ical auction in ComprasNet, bidders are retailers or wholesalers who have good
knowledge of their private costs before entering the auction. Bidders are unlikely
to spend large amounts of time reading lots’ descriptions, as these are short due
to the standardisation of products being traded. We therefore interpret the time
and effort that bidder put in preparing their bids in as a cost imposed by the
formal requirements technological limitations of ComprasNet.
The data we use has at least two features that are distinct from previously used
data. First, we observe auctions both before and after the programme was intro-
duced. Pre-intervention data helps in the identification of the programme impact
on auction outcomes. Secondly, the data spans various industries with different
pools of potential bidders. Previous studies have focused almost exclusively on
road construction (Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Marion (2007)) and timber
harvest (Athey et al. (2011a), Brannman and Froeb (2000)). Our setting allows to
see if previous findings generalize and improves our understanding about such
policies.
Our work contributes to the empirical literature on endogenous participation
in auctions, e.g. Li and Zheng (2009), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Athey
2Bid preparation costs are also relevant in other settings. Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003) argue that
in eBay auctions for collectible coins bidders must spend time collecting book values and other
information on the lots being sold.
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et al. (2011b), Groeger (2011). The fundamental methodological problem with es-
timating models of market entry is the existence of multiple equilibria. Recent
works typically proceed by making some kind of equilibrium selection assump-
tion.3 For example, Athey et al. (2011a) consider an equilibrium in which large
firms participate with probability one, and small firms use a mixed strategy. We
build on the work of Bajari et al. (2010) to deal with multiple equilibria in the
participation stage. Differently from the approaches currently used in the literat-
ure, Bajari et al. (2010) propose an equilibrium selection mechanism that can be
estimated together with the model primitives. The main advantage of this idea
is that it allow us to estimate games with multiple equilibria without imposing
restrictive assumptions on how equilibrium actions are played.
In our structural estimation, we also face challenges due to the open nature of
the auctions we analyse. Point identification of open auction models requires two
restrictive assumptions, namely that bidders’ valuations are independent private
costs and that bidders play a button auction (Athey and Haile (2002)). We take an
alternative approach and consider only information on bidders’ entry decisions
to estimate a reduced-form specification for bidders’ utilities, as in Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991).
Empirically, few studies have addressed the effects of set aside programmes.
To the best of our knowledge, the only two studies using data from set aside auc-
tions are those of Brannman and Froeb (2000) and Athey et al. (2011a).4 Both stud-
ies analyse the set aside programme held by US Forest Service timber auctions –
though using different datasets. According to the programme, in a fraction of
the auctions only small mills or loggers are allowed to participate. Without con-
sidering endogenous entry, Brannman and Froeb (2000) find that eliminating the
set aside programme would increase government revenues by 15%. Athey et al.
(2011a) find that the set aside programme induces losses both in terms of revenue
(5%) and efficiency (17%). However, by assuming endogenous entry Athey et al.
(2011a) show that the losses are mitigated in set aside auctions due to the entry
of small firms – without this effect the losses would be 30% in terms of revenue
and 28% in terms of efficiency. Athey et al. (2011a) also use the model to estim-
ate the effect of changing the set aside programme to a bid subsidy programme
and find that with a 6% bid subsidy small firms would win the same proportion
of auctions, the price would be 4% higher, and the efficiency would increase by
2%.5
3The early literature (Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1990)) placed restriction on the players’ pay-
offs and assumed away mixed strategy equilibria. The set of pure strategy equilibria gives a
unique mapping to the the total number of entrants.
4Ayres and Cramton (1996) provide a case study of bid subsidies in the US Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) auctions.
5There are other two important works analysing the effects of bid subsidy programmes.
Marion (2007) studies the effect of bid subsidies in California highway procurement auction. He
finds that bid subsidy programme decrease the participation of big firms, and make them bid
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses
the institutional setting of ComprasNet auctions. Section 4.3 presents the data
and provides some descriptive analysis. In Section 4.4 we provide reduced-form
evidence of the effects of the set-aside programme on auction outcomes. In Sec-
tion 4.5 we present the structural model we take to the data. Section 4.6 discusses
the estimation procedure.
4.2 Background: ComprasNet Auctions and the Set-
Aside programme
ComprasNet Auctions The Brazilian public administration has used reverse
auctions as a procurement method for various types of off-the-shelf goods since
2001. Such auctions are commonly referred to as ComprasNet auctions, after the
government-run internet portal that hosts the online bidding platform and list-
ings for public procurement auctions.6 Listings are posted by purchasing units
(PUs) of federal public bodies (PBs).7 In our sample, we observe 203 PBs with
a total of 1,730 PUs located across 318 municipalities.8 As of 2005, it is mandat-
ory for PUs to use ComprasNet auctions to procure off-the-shelf goods.9 In 2010,
50% of all procurement for the federal government was conducted through Com-
prasNet, totalling R$ 27 billion, or 0.7% of Brazil’s GDP. In short, these auctions
represent a large share of federal tenders and a substantial amount is contracted
every year through them.
A ComprasNet auction starts with a PU defining lots it needs to purchase.
Typically, several lots are procured at the same letting session; such lots are said
to form a batch.10 Upon defining lots’ characteristics, the PU conducts market
research, whereby at least three different firms give quotes for each lot. A reserve
price for each lot is calculated as the average of these quotes, and it is meant to
capture the retail price of the lot. The PU then advertises the tender at least 8
more aggressively. The overall effect is an increase the price by 3.8%. Krasnokutskaya and Seim
(2011), also working with California highway procurement auction, conclude that bid subsidies
increases the procurement costs by less than 1%.
6www.comprasnet.gov.br.
7In the Brazilian federal administration, a purchasing unit is called a Unidade de Adminstrac¸a˜o
de Servic¸os Gerais (UASG).
8The sample used is described in detail in Section 4.3.
9ComprasNet auctions cannot be used for procuring one-of-a-kind goods, engineering works
or any project in which bids have multiple dimensions (e.g., technique and price). For each of
these cases, different procurement methods are available.
10We emphasize such feature here because it will matter when we explain the set-aside pro-
gramme and participation costs. Batches are a common feature of many auction settings; for
examples relating to different industries, see Hendricks et al. (1987) for oil leases, Groeger (2011)
for road construction works and Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) for arts and wine auctions. In the
Comprasnet auctions we analyse, the timing in which lots are open for bidding typically overlaps.
We therefore assume that lots in a batch are auctioned off simultaneously.
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working days before the letting session and publishes a tender document. The
tender document contains a detailed description of each lot, including reserve
prices, and is free to download from ComprasNet.
We focus on online ComprasNet auctions, the predominant procurement method
since 2005.11 Bidders must submit binding sealed bids before a deadline specified
in the tender document to qualify to participate in the auction. When the auction
starts, the low bid is announced and bidders engage in an open auction. Through-
out the auction bidders only know what the current low bid is; they don’t learn
how many bidders are bidding, let alone their identities. The winner is the firm
making the lowest bid.
Set Aside Programme In October 2007, the federal government introduced a
bid preference programme for small and micro enterprises (SME). The programme
consists of setting aside eligible lots for SMEs.12 Due to ambiguous wording in the
regulation implementing the set-aside programme, there are two competing eli-
gibility criteria:
(C1) the lot’s reserve price must be below R$ 80,000;
(C2) the batch’s total reserve price (i.e., the sum of the reserve prices for all lots
in the batch) must be below R$ 80,000.
Criterion C2 is therefore more stringent than C1. Procurement officials have con-
siderable discretion in carrying out these auctions. Besides deciding which eli-
gibility criterion to use, they may opt not to apply restrictions to eligible lots. In
fact, the set aside programme explicitly instructs officials not to apply restrictions
when they are expected to result in substantially higher procurement costs, or in
fewer than three bidders participating in the auction.13
4.3 Data
We analyse data of auctions held between October 2007 and December 2010. We
use two sources of data. First, we use publicly available data automatically re-
11Before 2005, it was common for PUs to use an offline version of the ComprasNet auction
analysed in this paper.
12See Lei Complementar 123/2006 (14 December 2006) and Decreto 6204 (05 September 2007).
Among other requirements, to qualify as a micro (small) enterprise, a firm must not have gross
revenues larger than R$ 240,000 (2,400,000). This threshold was changed in 2009 to R$ 360,000
(3,600,000).
13Procurement officers seem to have different views on when to set aside eligible lots. Ap-
proximately 25% of the public organisations never restrict participation, while another 25% only
restrict when criterion C2 is met. Among the organisations which restrict participation in eli-
gible lots, there is considerable variation in the proportion of eligible lots which end up being
restricted. In other words, public bodies which are similar in terms of observables seem have
different policies. In future versions of this paper, we plan to use this cross-section variation to
help identifying the impacts of the set aside programme.
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corded by the ComprasNet platform. For each lot, ComprasNet collects the fol-
lowing information: which firms bid and all bids placed by each firm; whether
the firm is registered as SME with tax authorities; the size of the lot; the pur-
chasing unit running the auction. Second, we complement these with internal
data from the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management. This data contain
information on lots, bidders, and purchasing units. On lots, there is a paragraph-
long description of the item along with classification codes following the United
States’ Federal Supply Codes (FSC) for materials and the U.N. Central Product
Classification for services. These classification schemes define product categories
by 2-digit codes, and sub-categories by 4-digit. There are also finer 6-digit codes
which are created by purchasing units if needed. On bidders, we have their geo-
graphical locations and industry defined by the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC). Finally, the internal data contains the geographical location
of purchasing units, as well as their place within the government’s organizational
structure.
We restrict the sample to seven commonly purchased products, namely ink
cartridges, A4 paper, printers, air conditioning, coffee powder, computers, and
bottled cooking gas. We select these products for two reasons. First, these are
commonly purchased products with reasonable variation in treatment. Second,
by focusing on a narrower set of products we can extract lots’ characteristics from
text data using a piece of computer software. We can ensure, for example, that all
lots of the same product category are measured in the same units.14 The appendix
gives further detail of the sample composition.
Table 4.1 reports sample descriptive statistics for restricted and unrestricted
lots. Unrestricted lots have significantly higher reservation prices. On a typical
unrestricted lot there are 2 large bidders participating, and 15 small bidders. This
represents a proportion of small bidders of 88 percent in a typical unrestricted
lot. Small firms however win 82 percent of the lots, suggesting that there are
asymmetries between small and large bidders.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the effects of criteria C1 and C2 on the probability that a
lot is restricted. This is the variation in the data we use to identify the effects of
the set aside programme on auction outcomes. The figure plots the probability
that a lot is restricted against the lot’s reservation price and weather or not the lot
belongs in a batch whose overall reservation price is below R$80,000. The figure
shows that 14 percent of lots meeting criterion C1 but not C2 are treated, and that
this proportion increases to 40 percent for lots meeting both criteria.
14We plan to expand the set of products analysed. This is a time-consuming task though, as it















































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 20 40 60 80 100
Lot Reserve Price (1,000 R$)
Batch Above R$80,000 Batch Below R$80,000
Notes: Dots represent local averages in R$ 2,000 bins. Fitted lines are from a probit regression of the treatment in-
dicator on a 4th-order polynomial of the running variable (lot’s reserve price), Bi and interactions of the polynomial
and Bi . The regression uses only lots with reserve price below R$ 80,000.
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4.4 Reduced Form Analysis
The ideal experiment The theory gives ambiguous predictions regarding the
effects of a set-aside programme on both revenues and participation. The ob-
jective of this section is to estimate the impact of the ComprasNet set-aside pro-
gramme on auction outcomes imposing minimal assumptions to the data. The
ideal experiment in such setting would be to randomly restrict participation in
some auctions, and then measure the differences in procurement costs and par-
ticipation across restricted and unrestricted auctions. However feasible, we are
unaware of such an experiment being carried out. From the discussion in Sec-
tion 4.2, it is unlikely that our sample of restricted auctions has been randomly
selected from the pool of eligible auctions. In particular, procurement officers are
instructed to base their decisions on expected auction outcomes. While we, as
econometricians, can observe some variables influencing officers’ decisions (e.g.,
geographical region), we cannot be certain to observe all such relevant variables.
A simple comparison between restricted and unrestricted auctions is therefore
likely to give inconsistent estimates of the desired effects.
To illustrate the empirical challenge we face, consider estimating the following
equation:
yi =βSASi + Xiγ+ λt + εi, (4.1)
where yi is the outcome of interest (winning bid or number of bidders) in auc-
tion i and SASi indicates whether auction i is restricted to SMEs. The vector Xi
contains auction characteristics which determine outcomes. For example, it may
contain the geographic location of delivery, and the lots’ reserve price. Note that
Xi may contain variables used by procurement officers when deciding whether
or not to restrict participation in auction i. The term εi represents unobserved
auction characteristics that determine auction outcomes. As argued above, εi is
likely to contain relevant information for the decision-making of whether to re-
strict participation. Hence, Cov(εi, SASi) 6= 0, making the OLS estimator for β
inconsistent.
To overcome these concerns, we explore the discontinuity created by criteria
C1 and C2 to identify β in equation (4.1). Because not all lots meeting either C1 or
C2 are restricted, we end up with a fuzzy discontinuity around the cutoff values
used by each criterion. To be more precise, let Li = 1 if the reserve price of lot i
is below R$ 80,000 and 0 otherwise; and Bi = 1 if the reserve price of the batch in
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which lot i belongs is below R$ 80,000, and 0 otherwise. Now, let
Pr[SASi = 1|ri] =

0, if Li = 0;
g2(ri), if Li = 1, Bi = 0;
g3(ri), if Bi = 1.
(4.2)
We assume that g2(ri) and g3(ri) can be described as p-order polynomials on ri,
so that
E[SASi = 1|ri] =
[

























+ δ20Li + α0Bi,
where αj = δ3j − δ2j, j = 0, ..., p. The second equality uses the fact that LiBi =
Bi. This last equation tells us that Li and Bi, as well as the interaction terms
riLi, ..., r
p
i Li, riBi, ..., r
p
i Bi can be used as instruments for SASi, since none of these
terms belongs in (4.1).
This strategy assumes that the reserve prices are not manipulated in order to
cross the eligibility threshold in any way. The fact that procurement officials are
not mandated to restrict participation in auctions mitigates this risk. Moreover,
using pre-intervention data we are able to test this assumption. We find no evid-
ence that reserve prices have have a disproportionate chance to fall on either side
of the eligibility threshold during the treatment period vis-a-vis the pre-treatment
period.
4.4.1 Results
Table 4.2 presents OLS and IV results from estimating equation 4.1. We look at
the effects of the set aside programme on the winning bid (conditional there be-
ing a winner) and the number of bidders. The specifications in columns (1) and
(2) include dummies for each product category interacted with year dummies,
reservation price and size of the lot. We also include state and quarter dummies.
Column (3) restricts the sample to lots with reserve price around the discontinuity
of R$80,000.
The results in the first row suggest that restricting participation to SMEs has
very little effect, on average, on the winning bid (conditional on the lot being
awarded). Both the OLS and two-stage least squares estimates are negative, in-
dicating that winning bids actually fall, but these results are not statistically signi-
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Table 4.2: Results: IV estimates
OLS 2SLS
Full Sample Discontinuity
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3)
Log of Price -.010 -.014 .019
(.005) (.018) (.026)
Number of bidders -1.070*** 2.436*** .019
(.070) (.231) (.332)
Instruments
B. Interaction (Quad) yes
N 74,009 74,009 3,954
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) include as controls dummies for each product category interacted with year
dummies, reservation price and size of the lot. We also include state and quarter dummies. Column (2)
uses Bi , Biri and Bir2i as instruments for SASi . Column (3) restricts the sample to lots with reserve price
between R$69,000 and R$91,000. *** indicates significance at the 0.01% level.
ficant at the 5 percent level. The estimate in the discontinuity sample is positive,
but again not significant at the usual levels.
The results on the number of entrants, presented in the second row, are am-
biguous. The OLS estimate is negative, indicating that the number of participants
decrease by one bidder when participation is restricted. The two-stage least
squares estimate, on the other hand, suggest that the number of entrants increase
by 2 bidders. To reconcile these results, recall that the IV estimator recovers the
local-average treatment effect, that is, the effect of the set aside programme on
the sub-population of compliers. In the present setting, the compliers are those
lots which are restricted if and only if (i) the reserve price is below R$80,000 and
(ii) the restriction is unlikely to have adverse effects on auction outcomes (i.e.,
winning bid and participation).
Overall, the evidence suggests that the SAS programme had positive effects
on entry, but no effects on prices. This is consistent with the following story.
The SAS programme induces the entry of SMEs, which more than compensates
the reduction in the number of large bidders. The increase in the number of SMEs
however does not translate into lower prices because, possibly, SMEs have higher
costs in comparison to large bidders. This will motivate the structural model that
we use to estimate the primitives of the auction game.
4.4.2 Testing Instrument Validity
Our identification strategy uses the discontinuity created by eligibility rules. This
assumes reserve prices are not manipulated in order to cross the eligibility threshold























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ciple are not under the control of the PU, there are a number of ways it could
be manipulated by procurement officials. For example, the size of the lot could
be changed. The fact that procurement officials are not mandated to restrict par-
ticipation in auctions should mitigate the risk of inflating reserve prices. Still,
using pre-intervention data we are able to to provide evidence in support of this
assumption.
As a test to validate our identifying assumption, we first restrict the sample
to auctions with reserve prices around the discontinuity. We then test whether
auctions after the policy change have increased chances of lying on either side of
the cutoff. We experiment with various windows widths and various “placebo”
cutoffs, to allow for the possibility that the distribution of reserve prices changes
over time. That is, we search for changes at the cut-off of R$ 80,000 which are
unusual vis-a`-vis other cutoffs. For example, there might be bunching around
multiples of R$ 10,000; if that is the case, then looking only at the R$ 80,000 would
wrongly suggest that reserve prices are tweaked to meet (or unmeet) eligibility
criteria.15
Formally, for various cutoffs c and window widths w, we restrict the sample to
auctions with ri ∈ (c−w, c+w), and define belowi = 1 if ri ∈ (c−w, c], and zero
otherwise. That is, belowi is an indicator of whether the reserve price is auction i
is just below the cut-off c, where “just below” is defined by window width w. We
then run the regression
belowi = α+ βA f terOct07i + εi, (4.4)
where A f terOct07i = 1 if the auction is held after the SAS programme star-
ted. The parameter β gives the differential chance that auctions in the treatment
period fall just below the cut-off.
We plot β̂ along with 95% confidence intervals in Figure 4.2 for various cutoffs
and windows of R$500 and R$5,000. The top row of Figure 4.2 reveals that lots’
reserve prices have a slightly higher change of falling just below the R$80,000
cutoff in the treatment period. This effect is not statistically significant at the
5% level when the window is R$500 and is just significant when we expand the
window to R$5,000. More importantly, the effect at R$80,000 is not different (stat-
istically nor visually) from the placebo cutoffs. The same can be said about the
plots at the bottom of Figure 4.2, which use batches’ reserve prices. As opposed to
lots, batches have a decreased chance of laying at the bottom half of the window
after October 2007. Again, this effect is not different from those at other placebo
cut-offs. Overall, taking the pre-treatment period as a baseline, there is no evid-
ence that reserve prices are manipulated around the cutoff of R$80,000 during the
15We could also perform the test suggested by McCrary (2008). This test should be included in
future versions of this paper. McCrary (2008) however does not use pre-intervention in his test.
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Batch Reserve Price
Window = 5
Notes: each panel shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of estimates of β in equation (4.4). The top
left panel consider windows of R$500 on lots’ reserve price. The bottom-right panel considers windows of R$5,000
on batches’ overall reserve prices.
treatment period.
4.5 Structural Model
In this section we develop a structural model to study the effects of the set aside
programme and alternative counterfactual policies on procurement costs. We
first define an entry model with type-symmetric players that maps observed auc-
tion characteristics and entry costs on the distribution of the number of entrants.
We then use this distribution to calculate expected procurement costs.
4.5.1 Entry Model
We focus on a model with two types of players, small and large. We assume that
players are type-symmetric: all players from the same type draw their private
information from the same distribution and use the same entry strategies. Sym-
metry is a standard assumption and avoids computational issues involved in the
solution and the estimation of entry models with a large number of players. In
what follows we specify the main assumptions behind the structural model.
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Basic Assumptions
Players We consider a procurement auction with Ns small potential bidders and
Nl large potential bidders. From this pool of potential bidders ns ≤ Ns and
nl ≤ Nl denotes the number of small and large firms participating in the auction.
Bidders are type-symmetric, meaning that the subscript j identify any player i ∈
j, i ≤ N j, j ∈ {s, l}.
Entry costs Bidders have type-specific entry costs K j + ej, where K j is a type-
specific parameter and ej is a type-specific shock. We assume that players observe
both K j and ej, whereas ej is not observed by the econometrician. We are therefore
assuming that the entry stage is a complete information game, as in Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991, 1990).
Payoffs Conditional on entry, bidders of type j have ex-ante expected utilities




where x is a vector of
auction characteristics. The vector of auction characteristics, x, is observed by all
the bidders and by the econometrician.
Sequence of actions Formally, the game has two stages. In the first stage, play-
ers simultaneously choose either to enter (aj = 1) or to stay out of the auction
(aj = 0). In the second stage, bidders learn about their completion costs and sub-
mit bids in the open auction. The procurement contract is awarded to the low
bidder.
Solution of the entry model
To solve the model, we restrict attention to (subgame perfect) Nash Equilibria in




space. Solving for equilibria in non-degenerated
mixed-strategies is not feasible in our setting due to the increased number of po-
tential entrants.16In the next paragraphs we use the hypotheses outlined in the
last section and this equilibrium concept to solve the model. The solution of this






First stage: pure strategy entry In the first stage bidders know the number
of small and large potential bidders, the specification of the contract and entry
costs. They estimate the expected profit conditional on winning the auction,
16One possible solution for the feasibility problem is to restrict attention to a set of bidders–
say, regular bidders–instead of restricting attention to a set of equilibria as we currently do. We
are working on such a solution as an alternative. In principle, one could accommodate in this
framework other equilibrium concepts. In future versions of this paper, we plan to estimate a






, and choose simultaneously either aj = 1 or aj = 0. Formally, the
expected utility from aj = 1 or aj = 0 is given by:
U j
(















where I (.) is an indicator function that assumes 1 if the condition inside the par-
enthesis is satisfied.
Second stage: bidding In the second stage, entrants learn their completion
costs and simultaneously submit their bids. To analyse bidding decisions we
must specify the format of our auction and how completion costs are distrib-
uted across bidders. It turns out that point identification of the distribution of
bidders’ valuations in an open auction requires the independent private value
paradigm as well as the assumption that bidders play a “button’ auction (Athey
and Haile (2002)). These are strong assumptions, and recent works have taken
the approach of working with incomplete models of open auctions and estimate
bounds on the distribution of valuations (Haile and Tamer (2003)) or seller’s rev-
enues (Aradillas-Lo´pez et al. (2011)). We take a different approach.17 As already
hinted by our notation, we do not use bidding information to identify entry costs.
We are thus agnostic about the auction format and the distribution of private val-




, and assume it is a known
function of the number of small and large participants and of auction character-





will be estimated only using information on the number of
small and large participants as well as auction covariates.
Equilibria Using the set of hypothesis discussed above we find the subgame






> 0. For any
{
K j, x, ej, uj (.) ; j ∈ {s, l}}, where
uj (.) is any function defined inR, the pair
(
ns, nl
) ≤ (Ns, Nl) is a Nash Equilibrium
17It is not clear that the bounds approach is feasible in our setting. Unlike our paper, the liter-
ature taking the bounds approach do not consider endogenous participation and entry costs. The
challenge is to identify entry costs K j with bounds on uj
(









− Ks − es ≥ 0
}
I (0 < ns ≤ Ns){
us
(
ns + 1, nl, x
)
− Ks − es < 0
}














ns, nl + 1, x
)




0 ≤ nl < Nl
)
Proof. See Appendix.






is a Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies for the entry game. It should
be noted that (i) neither the existence nor the uniqueness of equilibrium in pure
strategies is guaranteed and (ii) the inexistence and the multiplicity of equilibria





will be ill defined. This in turn impedes the
estimation of the model, see Bajari et al. (2010) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1990).
Existence Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) solve the inexistence problem restricting
the format of uj (.). In our setting it is easy to see that if uj (.) is non increas-
ing in nj then, for any
{




) ≤ (Ns, Nl) that solves the system of inequalities in proposition 4.1.
Here we followed the same approach proposed in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990)
and assumed that uj (.) is non increasing in nj.
Multiplicity To address the multiplicity problem we construct an equilibrium
selection mechanism using the idea proposed by Bajari et al. (2010). More spe-
cifically, for any
{





solving the system in proposition 4.1 and e (K, x, e, u (.)) a partic-
ular element of E (K, x, e, u (.)). Now define the following dummy variables:
y1(e (K, x, e, u (.))) = 1 i f ns > nl; 0 otherwise
y2(e (K, x, e, u (.))) = 1 i f ns < nl; 0 otherwise
y3(e (K, x, e, u (.))) = 1 i f ns = nl; 0 otherwise,
which holds for every e (K, x, e, u (.)) ∈ E (K, x, e, u (.)) and every possible in-
formation set,
{
K j, x, ej, uj (.) ; j ∈ {s, l}}. Now define the following cdf over the
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set of equilibria E (K, x, e, u (.)):
λ [e (K, x, e, u (.)) ; θ] =
exp
{













p=1 is a set of auxiliary parameters weighting the probability
of any equilibrium in E (K, x, e, u (.)) according to the equilibrium characteristics
defined by the set of dummy variables, y.
Entry probabilities Based on the structure used to address multiplicity and in-





conditional on the set of parameters and observed
auction characteristics. The following proposition brings this result.






































) |e, N, K, x, θ, u (.)) is an indicator function that assumes 1 if (ns, nl)
satisfies the system of inequalities in proposition 4.1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.2 establishes a mapping from
{
N j, K j, x, θ, uj (.) ; j ∈ {s, l}} into
the distribution of the number of players. Intuitively, based on this map one can
understand the effects of changes in auction characteristics, number of potential
players, entry costs, etc. on participation decisions of small and large players. In
the next subsection we use this distribution to define expected procurement costs.
4.5.2 Procurement Costs
Auction structure For a given number of bidders, n = ns + nl, participating in





n−1:n ≤ ... ≤ Vn
s,nl
1:n , and as F
ns,nl
k:n (·) the distribution of Vn
s,nl
k:n . Notice
firstly that because the order statistics depends not only on the total number of
bidders in the uction, n, but also on the composition of the pool, ns, nl, we indexed
our order statistics and the respective distributions on ns, nl.
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Notice as well that we are not making any assumption on the distribution of
valuations. As in Aradillas-Lo´pez et al. (2011) we assume that in any auction with
n = ns + nl bidders the transaction price is the minimum between the reserve
price and the second lowest cost of the bidders participating in that auction.
Entry We assume that, ex-ante, the government does not observe the number





ditional on the information set
{
N j, K j, x, θ, uj (.) ; j ∈ {s, l}}. All the elements
in this information set are observed by the government. The distribution over(
ns, nl
)
was defined in proposition 4.2.
Reserve prices To calculate procurement expected costs we used the fact that in
our auctions estimated reserve prices, r, are always equal to the cost estimated by
the government engineers, pi0. The main advantage of this hypothesis is that it
allows us to calculate expected procurement costs as a function of second highest
distributions only, implying that expected procurement costs can be estimated
directly from our data without the necessity of applying any procedure based on
the estimation of bounds–see Haile and Tamer (2003) and Aradillas-Lo´pez et al.
(2011).
Procurement costs In the next proposition we define a closed form expression
for ex-ante expected procurement costs.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that the following set of assumption holds:
1. Government observes the tuple
{





is distributed according to the probability function in proposition (4.2);
3. The winning bid is the highest between the reserve price and the second lowest cost;
and,
4. Reserve prices, r, are always equal to the cost estimated by the government engin-
eers, pi0.
Then ex-ante expected procurement costs are given by:


















n−1:n (v|x) is the distribution of the second lowest costs conditional on the vector




In this section we design an estimation procedure that allows us to estimate the
entry probabilities in proposition 4.2 and subsequently the procurement costs,
described in equation (4.8). The estimation procedure is divided in two blocks.
In the first part we set up a minimum distance estimator that allows us to con-
sistently estimate the parameters of the entry model, {K, θ, u (.)}. With these
elements we can define entry probabilities. In the second part we estimate the
distributions of completion costs. With the distribution of completion costs and
the entry probabilities we can finally calculate expected procurement costs.
4.6.1 Estimation of the Entry Model
To estimate the entry model we propose an Asymptotic Least Squares Estimator
(hereafter ALSE) similar to that used by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)
(see also Gourieroux and Monfort (1995)). Before describing the details of this
procedure we invoke a new set assumptions that will be used in the empirical
model.
Data Suppose that the econometrician observes a set of T = 1, 2, ..., T auctions.








t , xt; ∀t ∈ T
}
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with cdf denoted by Fe (., .).









. From now on we assume that this function
is known and we denote it by uj
(
ns, nl, x; β
)
, where β is a vector of parameters to
be estimated.
The estimator Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) propose an ALSE to es-
timate dynamic games. In what follows we adapt this idea to the present frame-
work. Generically, the ALSE is defined directly from the theoretical constraint
developed in proposition 4.2. The estimation is developed in two steps. In the
first step we estimate the vector of entry probabilities in the LHS of (4.7) using
the available data. The RHS of the same equation is simulated using the equi-
librium conditions and the distribution of the unobservables. In the second step
we choose the vector of parameters, {K, θ, β}, that minimizes the (weighted) dif-
ference between the LHS and the RHS of (4.7). Formally, the LHS of (4.7) can








t , xt; ∀t ∈ T
}
. For this one can
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s, nlt = n






is a consistent estimator of the LHS of (4.7). In this expression, K (·) is a kernel
function and ht is a given bandwidth. For the RHS of the equilibrium condition
we fix (N, K, x, θ, β) and take d = 1, 2, ..., D draws from the distribution of e.












) |ed, N, K, x, θ, β) λ [e (ed, K, x, β) = (ns, nl) ; θ]
D
(4.10)
In practice, for any auction t ∈ T one can calculate consistent estimates of





using the non parametric approach in expression (4.9) and the procedure sum-
marized by equation (4.10). By stacking the difference between the LHS and the
RHS of (4.7) for all equilibrium pairs and for all auctions, the ALS estimator for
the model parameters solves:
min
K,θ,β
( pˆ− pˆ(K, θ, β))′W ( pˆ− pˆ(K, θ, β)) ,
where pˆ and pˆ(K, θ, β) are column vectors with dimension corresponding to the
number of possible equilibrium pairs in each auction times the number of ob-
served auctions and W is a weight matrix. Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler
(2008) derive the asymptotic distribution of the efficient ALSE building on Gouri-
eroux and Monfort (1995) that, in turn, show that the ALSE is asymptotically nor-
mal. Given, however, the complexities involved in the estimation of the asymp-
totic matrix of the ALSE we estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the estim-
ated parameters using a bootstrap procedure and use the asymptotic normality
result for inference.
4.6.2 Estimation of Procurement Costs
Now we turn to the estimation of expected procurement costs. To do this, we
firstly estimate the term inside the square brackets in equation (4.8), that gives




























where x is a given vector of covariates, K (·) is a kernel function, ht is a given
bandwidth and Bt is the winning bid in auction l. With this element it is straight-
forward to see that a consistent estimator of expected procurement costs are:
pˆi
(








|N, x; Kˆ, θˆ, βˆ
)
− pi0
With this expression we close our estimation procedure. In the next section we
estimate the parameters of this model and provide some “goodness of fit” ana-
lysis. Subsequently we discuss how we can use this model to calculate the costs
of the set aside policy and to produce counterfactuals.
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper we analyse the effects of a set aside programme targeting small and
micro enterprises (SMEs) in Brazil. We use data from ComprasNet, the online
bidding platform used by the Brazilian federal government for procurement of
various goods and services.
We first provided reduced-form evidence on the effects of the programme us-
ing a fuzzy RDD approach. We found that restricting participation of large firms
has little effect on prices, while it increases participation of small firms. This find-
ing is consistent with a model of bidder asymmetry and costly participation. In
such a model, restricting participation of large, strong bidders increases the in-
centives of small, weak bidders to participate thus mitigating the adverse effects
of the restriction on prices. The increase in the number of SMEs however does
not translate into lower prices because, possibly, SMEs have higher costs in com-
parison to large bidders.
Based on the reduced form evidence, we then set up a structural model to
estimate entry costs and simulate the effects of alternative policy rules on parti-
cipation and procurement costs. Our model has two interesting features. First,
differently from the exiting literature, the model and estimation approach pro-
posed here explicitly deals with the multiple equilibria problem arising from
entry games with asymmetric players. In particular, we addressed the multi-
plicity problem using an equilibrium selection mechanism in the spirit of Bajari
et al. (2010).
Second, because we observe open auctions and because point identification
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of open auction models requires very restrictive assumptions - namely that bid-
ders’ valuations are independent private costs and that bidders play a button
auction (Athey and Haile (2002)) - we considered only information on bidders’
entry decisions to estimate a reduced-form specification for bidders utilities, as
in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). Based on this approach we are able to point estim-
ate bidders’ entry costs and subsequently government procurement costs using
weaker assumptions than those normally used in the literature that studies the
estimation of open auctions – Aradillas-Lo´pez et al. (2011) and Haile and Tamer
(2003).
Another interesting feature of the ComprasNet setup is that it allow us to
interpret estimated entry costs as red-tape costs. In ComprasNet, bidders are
retailers or wholesalers who have good knowledge of their private costs before
entering the auction. Bidders are unlikely to spend large amounts of time reading
lots’ descriptions, as these are short due to the standardisation of products being
traded. It means, therefore, that entry costs captures opportunity costs of filling
forms, providing documentation and abiding to certain formal procedures. With
the structural model we can estimate the magnitude of these costs and analyse
how the reduction in bureaucratic procedures affects participation of small and





Appendix to Chapter 2
This appendix describes the quasi-hard close algorithm described in section 2.1.
1. At the start of Phase C, draw X from Unif[5,30] minutes.
2. d=X.
3. While d<28:






Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Suppose the system of inequalities in proposition 4.1
holds. Then, no firms (small or big) have an incentive to leave the auction as
the outside option is equal to zero. Likewise, no outside firms (small or big)





satisfying the system of equations in proposition 4.1 is a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Conversely, suppose there is pair
(
ns, nl
) ≤ (Ns, Nl) that is a Nash equilib-











0 < nj ≤ N j
)
(B.1)
For j = s and/or j = l. Then, the firms in the group that are making negative




ns + 1, nl, x
)
− K j − ej ≥ 0
}
I (0 ≤ ns < Ns) (B.2)




) ≤ (Ns, Nl) cannot be a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 Notice that:
∑
e(K,x,e,u(.))∈E(K,x,e,u(.))
λ [e (K, x, e, u (.)) ; θ] = 1 (B.3)
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Therefore, the probability of observing a given outcome
(
ns, nl
) ≤ (Ns, Nl)






Proof of Proposition 4.3 Under the hypotheses above, for a given (known)
number of small and big players pi
(
N, x; K, θ, u (.) |ns, nl) = ∫ r0 vdFns,nln−1:n (v|x)−
pi0 follows readily from Aradillas-Lo´pez et al. (2011). To get the final expression
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